Stability in Pakistan realizing the vision of enlightened moderation by Murnock, Tanya M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-03
Stability in Pakistan realizing the vision of
enlightened moderation
Murnock, Tanya M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor: Feroz H. Khan 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Stability in Pakistan: Realizing the Vision of Enlightened Moderation 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Capt. Tanya M. Murnock, USMC 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
      In its nearly 60 years of independence, Pakistan has never fully established an identity for itself that has not been 
restructured by subsequent administrations.  The military is one of the main elements of the federal political machine, 
and as such has assumed control of the government no less than four times in those 60 years – the first occurring 
shortly after independence when Pakistan’s founding father died before a government could be structured and formed. 
The current military ruler has stated his intention for a lasting establishment of a moderate and successful Muslim 
state.  With the spread of radical militant Islam throughout the region and the United States’ War on Terror as his 
constraints, President General Pervez Musharraf finds himself in a position where success now is crucial, not 
optional. The purpose of this study is to understand the environment in which Musharraf has to work, including some 
of his constraints, restraints and assets; provide a limited evaluation of the success of his policies to date; and to offer 
recommendations to Pakistan and to the United States for ways in which the plans can be modified to see a more 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 103 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Pakistan, Islam, Politics, Musharraf, Enlightened Moderation, Pervez 
Musharraf, secularization and modernity 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: REALIZING THE VISION OF ENLIGHTENED 
MODERATION 
 
Tanya M. Murnock 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., Oakland University, 1996 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: REALIZING THE VISION OF 
ENLIGHTENED MODERATION 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the public policy and programs of 
Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf administration, and in light of Pakistan’s unique history and 
culture, to offer recommendations for Pakistan and the United States for the successful 
realization of Musharraf’s “Enlightened Moderation” plan for a successful, stable 
Pakistan. 
In its nearly 60 years of independence, Pakistan has never fully established an 
identity for itself that has not been restructured by subsequent administrations.  The 
military is one of the main elements of the federal political machine, and as such has 
assumed control of the government no less than four times in those 60 years – the first 
occurring shortly after independence when Pakistan’s founding father died before a 
government could be structured and formed. The current military ruler has stated his 
intention for a lasting establishment of a moderate and successful Muslim state.  With the 
spread of radical militant Islam throughout the region and the United States’ War on 
Terror as his constraints, President General Pervez Musharraf finds himself in a position 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf’s own part in the story, we 
believe that Musharraf’s government represents the best hope for stability 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan – The 9/11 Commission Report1 
 
A.  PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide solutions to the question of how Pervez 
Musharraf can ensure the successful implementation of this political vision of a moderate 
Muslim state in Pakistan, and whether the United States should consider revising its 
policy.  While no one proposal is ever the perfect solution to a goal, to address every 
possible solution would require much more depth than can be covered here.  This thesis 
will focus on the feasibility, practicality, and probability of success of one plan:  that of 
Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation.  Additionally, it analyzes Musharraf’s plan in light 
of domestic and regional influence, in order to recommend modifications to enhance the 
likelihood of success.  This thesis evaluates the practicality of Musharraf’s goal, given 
the constraints of Pakistan’s political environment.  Nothing exists in a vacuum, 
especially the development of a nation.  Before any analysis or recommendations can be 
valid, a rudimentary understanding of the historical, regional and political influences that 
have shaped today’s Pakistan must be established. 
First, a review of the history and evolution of the use of religion as a mobilization 
tool for the realization of political goals in the region that is now Pakistan, and evaluate 
the influence of radical Islamist groups in rural and tribal Pakistan today.  This review 
will serve to illustrate a passive acceptance of political hijacking of religious sentiment, 
and why this tactic is tolerated in the region.  This tolerance is one force in mobilization 
against which Musharraf is competing for the realization of his vision; the abuse of which 
he referenced directly in the speech he gave after assuming the role of chief executive in 
October 1999.2 
                                                 
1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 369.  
2 Speech by Chief Executive of Pakistan, CJCSC and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, 
Islamabad, October 17, 1999. 
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The second issue for study is the influence from external forces on the evolution 
of Pakistani political and civil life.  The resistance to Soviet expansion into Afghanistan; 
the Iranian Revolution; and influence from extreme religious factions originating from 
Saudi Arabia all came into play within the last 35 years.   These influences were simply 
added to the pressure from the east, with lingering disparities with India since the 
Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 yet unsolved. 
Third is the state of the domestic and political structure of Pakistan today, 
including the societal factors and attitudes. Musharraf’s vision for Pakistan and these 
environmental factors that led him to choose this path for his nation are outlined.  This 
chapter also will review the courses of action Musharraf has implemented for the 
furtherance of his goal.  U.S. foreign policy toward economic aid, security cooperation 
and emergency assistance is included here, completing the picture that illustrates 
resources, assistance and effectiveness of the actions taken by both countries. 
This thesis concludes with a summary of the challenges Pakistan and Musharraf 
face, and suggestions for Pakistan and the United States to mitigate these challenges and 
to realize their common goals. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since its formation in 1947, Pakistan has undergone competing forces battling to 
define Pakistan’s national identity and makeup.  Since the terrorist attacks the United 
States in 2001, U.S. focus in Southwest Asia has been on the ousting of the Taliban from 
Afghanistan, the establishment of a new, stable government in that country, and 
Afghanistan’s struggle to establish political stability and national unity. 
While the stability of Afghanistan is important, U.S. security interests would be 
far better served with more support to the stability of Pakistan’s current moderate 
government, and the reduction of radical Islamist groups within the country.  Three issues 
should be of critical concern.  First, the strategic importance of Pakistan’s geographic 
location can be an asset to the United States, should Pakistan continue to develop into a 
stable, friendly ally.  Its proximity to Afghanistan, China, India and Iran place it in the 
heart of American economic and security interests. 
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Second, it is in the United States’ security interest to ensure that the nuclear 
capabilities of Pakistan remain in the control of a stable, rational, friendly government.  
Radical elements in this region have proven unpredictable; goals are determined by 
political desires, and realized by reinterpreting religious ideals in that favor.  A change in 
political goals could easily turn into a massive turn of religious ideology to support a 
regime’s whimsical use of overwhelming force against an adversary. 
Finally, the identity of Pakistan – defining Pakistan nationalism – will be the key 
to uniting the population in a shared national identity.  Marginalization of any region or 
segment of the population gives political extremists an opportunity to incorporate that 
element into its agenda.  Historically, religious extremism has been used to promote 
regional resistance to central powers.  A common vested interest in the future of a stable 
Pakistan could replace the influence of this extremism.   
Since the war in Afghanistan began, Musharraf has provided valuable assistance 
to the United States, while inviting militant Islamist violence toward the Pakistan 
government.  More recently, Musharraf has had to balance his cooperation with the 
United States with the leadership his people need, publicly opposing U.S. actions against 
Pakistani citizens while hunting suspected members of Al Qaeda, while taking care not to 
cut cooperation and access from across the border.  Ultimately, a stable, prosperous, 
secular Muslim nation in Southwest Asia will serve as a building block for stability and 
the fight against violent Islamism in the region. 
Attempts by other Muslim countries in the 20th Century to suppress the extremist 
elements or to deny religious expression for the purpose of secular modernity have met 
with violent opposition from their citizens.  The 1979 Shi’a revolution in Iran; Egypt’s 
imprisonment of militant Islamic factions; and Turkey’s forced secularization following 
the breakup of the Ottoman Empire are all examples of the ways in which such imposed 
modernity by governments have resulted in the disenfranchisement of large sections of 
the population and at times mass revolt by the people to secure their freedoms to 
incorporate Islam into their society.  A look at the provisions of Enlightened Moderation 
will determine where this plan differs from those of the past. 
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C.  PAKISTAN’S DUAL TRACKS 
If the structure of governance can be described as the parallel application of two 
influences, e.g. religion and politics, then a similar description can be made about the ebb 
and flow of the level of influence each source had on Pakistan’s attempts at identity and 
progress.  The two influences can be compared to tracks of a train, each following a 
different route, yet ending up at the same destination.  The destination here is a successful 
Pakistan.3  The definition of “success” may differ from each track, so the more 
generalized vision will be used.   
Track One will be identified here as the religious track.  Whether labeled 
orthodox, traditional or fundamentalist, the leaders trying to follow this track see Pakistan 
as an opportunity for the formation of an Islamic state, or the ideal place where rules of 
law and daily life are dictated by interpretations of Islamic texts.  Examples through 
Pakistan’s history stem from the early 19th century until the formation of Pakistan, to 
include the establishment of the Deobandi and Bareilly traditions and madrasas; the 
Khilafat Movement; the rise of Jama’at-i Islami; the Partition following Independence 
from British rule in 1947; and, in more recent history, the governance of Muhammed Zia 
ul-Haq from 1977 until his death in 1988.  The track gained new momentum in 
Afghanistan with the rise of Mullah Mohammed Omar and his Taliban militia in 1996, 
emboldening extremist faction within Pakistan to continue their opposition of moderate 
governments in Pakistan.  Whether the influence is initiated by outside groups, or 
indicated from the government, the fault with this track is which brand of Islam – whose 
interpretation of Islamic law – is to be the standard by which all must live. 
Track Two then can be the track of modernity.  The Anglo-Muhammadan College 
in Aligarh was founded in the 1870s to provide Muslim students the education and skills 
to succeed as Muslims and professionals in the Western style of government established 
in India by the British.4  Although established to cater to the Muslim community, the goal 
was to prepare students to function productively in a modern society.  Further examples 
include the visions of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal in the establishment 
                                                 
3 Feroz H. Khan, interview by Tanya M. Murnock, April 13, 2006, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, Calif.  Further expansion of the “two-track” description also credited to Khan. 
4 Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), 250-3. 
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of Pakistan.  Products of modern, western educations, the “Father of Pakistan” and his 
longtime colleague envisioned Pakistan not as a theocratic state ruled by clergy, but as a 
modern, secular nation where Muslims could practice and thrive free from oppression 
and discrimination.5 
Musharraf plans to swing the pendulum back to the modernity track, but with a 
decidedly Islamic overtone.  “Enlightened Moderation” refers to the modern path of 
today’s advanced nations, while recognizing that the makeup of Pakistani society is a 
Muslim one.  Islam has its place in society, but the individual citizen’s interpretation of 
the way the faith of Islam is practiced – or the choice not to practice – will outweigh any 
ideas of institutionalized compulsion.6 Using the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
for comparison, Barbara Metcalf’s observation that the Taliban’s success came not from 
the strict Islamist vision of governance, but because, “they were able to provide 
protection and stability in a context of warlordism, raping, and corruption.”7 Were it not 
for the war weary populace, the Taliban may never have gotten enough support to 
promulgate its extreme ideology.  However, with the Taliban on his western border, and 
common familial and tribal relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Musharraf’s 
vision of a moderate state ran against incredible odds.  Until the United States began its 
War on Terror and took an active role in the region, Musharraf was on his own.  One 
writer observed succinctly that during those years, “Musharraf weathered the storm, 
though uncertainty remained ascendant on the national horizon because of the lack of any 
major economic uplift, the international political situation, uninterrupted Indo-U.S. 
defense cooperation, and a populace increasingly disturbed over growing poverty, 
political waywardness, and an insecure future in an unstable as well as hostile region.”8 
 
                                                 
5 Wolpert, 341-3. 
6 Jehangir Karamat, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, in an interview with Tanya Murnock, 
in Washington, D.C., May 26, 2006. 
7 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Contestations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 277. 
8 Iftikhar H. Malik, “Pakistan in 2001: The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline 
State,” Asian Survey 42, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 205. 
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D. ENLIGHTENED MODERATION 
Although Musharraf detailed some vision of a modern and moderate Islamic 
society in his first speech as chief executive, the idea remained just an idea until after the 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.  Iran had presented an idea at the 
Organization of Islamic Countries that instead of what Samuel Huntington described as a 
Clash of Civilizations, leaders should be talking about a Dialog of Civilizations to try to 
understand the roots of terrorism and extremism.  While many delegates to the 
conference are believed to have agreed with the concept, a concrete plan was not 
produced at that time.9 
In Pakistan, however, Musharraf later developed a two-pronged strategy intended 
not only to stem terrorist activities, but to make the idea of religious extremism irrelevant, 
and at the same time promote growth and stability in Pakistan. The proximity of 
Afghanistan – host to the extremist elements that executed the attacks – and the U.S. 
government’s focused desire for justice made Islamabad realize that the time had come 
for a concrete, institutionalized plan to make this ideal a reality. 
The two main efforts of the plan are the preventive measures against existing and 
emerging terrorist activities, and the development of solutions designed keep people from 
turning toward militant extremism.10  Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, 
Ambassador Jehangir Karamat, believes that regimes in the past that tried to turn Pakistan 
toward a path of strict Islamic interpretation were never successful in the long term 
because the people of Pakistan wanted a society of representative governments, albeit an 
Islamic one.  To take all references to faith out of public life would not only keep 
Musharraf’s domestic agenda from continuing after he leaves office, but would 
encourage militant extremists and enable their influence over susceptible minds.11 
 
Comparing Enlightened Moderation to Other Secularization Policies 
 The idea to modernize and moderate Muslim nations is not new.  Following the 
breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War II, Turkey’s leader Mustafa 
                                                 
9 Karamat (May 26, 2006). 
10 Karamat (May 26, 2006). 
11 Karamat, (May 26, 2006). 
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Kamal Attaturk made dramatic, sweeping changes to the face of Turkish public society.  
The western-educated leader believed that the Westphalian model of governance, with its 
strict separation of religion and government, was the only way to ensure successful 
growth in the future, internationally integrated world.  This was particularly important in 
light of the previous identity of Turkey as the seat of the Muslim caliphate.  A very 
secular government would illustrate the far swing away from Turkey’s past. The country, 
however, has suffered significant internal social turmoil because of the extent to which 
Attaturk designed this concept for the nation.  Outward expression of religion by 
individuals has been extremely limited. In its attempt to develop into a secular, western-
style state, the government of Turkey has evolved to identify any outward expression of 
religion as an infringement on the secular society.  Headscarves, for instance, are not 
allowed to be worn by women in any public institution – regardless of the woman’s 
employment status or affiliation with the institution.  The strict interpretation leaves 
many Muslims feeling that their freedom to practice their religion is being oppressed by 
the government.12  Forbidding any outward expression of Islam in Pakistan would garner 
the same response as the compelled compliance with one Islamic interpretation:  heavy 
resistance. 
 The Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran made similar sweeping social changes in the name of 
modernity and progress.  The problems there stemmed from the lack of consideration to 
the population of Iran when these changes were enacted.  The revisions under Reza Shah 
that hit closest to home again were those based on religious expression.  Women were not   
only compelled to remove their veils, but had them pulled from their heads if the veils 
were worn in public.  The impact on the clergy was small at first, with the imposition of a 
standardized and institutional system for the bestowing of religious titles.  It was under 
this shah’s successor, his son Muhammed Reza Shah that the people of all classes and 
affiliations were pushed past their breaking point.  Land reforms were enacted with little 
or no regard for the quality of the land for farming.  Property managed by the clergy, 
traditionally off limits to civil government, was taken in the name of the state.  Besides 
the spiritual implications of the monarchy’s interference, the balance of power also 
shifted, stripping the clergy of influence in the government, even at the local level.  The 
                                                 
12 “Headscarf Ruling by the Turkish High Court Generates Tension,” Global Issues Report (March 8, 
2006). 
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merchant class fell victim to these changes in a drastic consequence.  In the shah’s vision 
to redesign the look of the cities, long established marketplaces were swept away to make 
room for the roads and parks that were to enhance the beauty of certain buildings – again 
without regard to the impact of the people.13 
 With so many elements of the population so dissatisfied with their system of 
government, a revolt of some sort seemed to be unavoidable.  However, the one unifying 
factor of all marginalized parties was the religious element.  This is not to say that the 
grievances of the clergy resonated with the other marginalized parties; but the charisma 
of Ruhollah Khomeini earned the backing of the factions. Many of these elements that 
supported Khomeini did so not because they favored the idea of theocratic rule, but 
because Khomeini rallied against the many bad decisions of the monarchy, and was seen 
as the best chance for success.  Without the disenfranchised religious element, and the 
clergy’s ability to spread the message through the mosques, perhaps no unified, dedicated 
opposition would have been waged against the crown – the diversified minority 
opposition would have had no other single “hero” to back.14    
 
E. SUMMARY 
Khalid Mahmud Arif sums up his view of Pakistan’s chances for success very 
nicely, writing, “Islam, an enlightened religion, has a remarkable flexibility in happily co-
existing with other religions and cultures.  A modern and moderate state, Pakistan has 
consistently abhorred extremism as an instrument of state policy.  The country now 
enjoys freedom of expression.  The rightist political parties are vociferous, and they 
attempt to arouse religious sensitivities on controversial issues.”15 
Although no single opinion or plan for the development of a society will ever be 
absolutely correct, some policies have proven more effective than others.  Global 
economics, religious and societal influences, external and historical influences will 
                                                 
13 Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 214-224. 
14 Nikki R. Keddie, “Religion, Ethnic Minorities, and the State in Iran: an Overview,” published in 
The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, edited by Ali Banuazizi and 
Myron Weiner (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 160-162. 
15 Khalid Mahmud Arif, “The Role of the Military in Politics: Pakistan 1947-97,” Pakistan: 
Founders’ Aspirations and Today’s Realities, Hafeez Malik ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 92. 
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always produce an ever changing, ever challenging mix of dynamics to which 
government policy must apply.  The purpose of this study is to understand the 
environment in which Musharraf has to work, including some of his constraints, restraints 
and assets; provide a limited evaluation of the success of his policies to date; and to offer 
recommendations to Pakistan and to the United States for ways in which the plans can be 



























II. ISLAM AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: FROM 
MOBILIZATION TO MISUSE 
There is a faulty perception among Muslims: that the West is attacking 
Islam. – Pervez Musharraf16 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The main conflict in the evolution of Pakistan’s politics has been the struggle to 
define Pakistan’s identity, represented generally by two ideals.  One ideal is held by 
moderate thinkers, such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah in the beginning, and Pervez 
Musharraf today.  The other ideal is that espoused by those who envision Pakistan society 
as a religious example to its Islamic neighbors, ruled by a system of governance that 
compels its citizens to live according to a strictly proscribed set of defined values.  While 
neither ideal has been able to place Pakistan on a permanent path, each has its strong 
supporters.   
When trying to analyze the effectiveness of President Musharraf’s political goals 
and policies for Pakistan, it is important then to understand the history of political Islam 
in this region.  In his speech five days after assuming the role of chief executive, 
Musharraf referenced the, “elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and 
bringing a bad name to our faith.”17 Understanding the evolution of the mobilization of 
religious sentiment is the key to countering its opposition to modernity. 
Religion is generally recognized as the most deeply ingrained and sensitive 
element of any person’s existence.  Therefore, it is little wonder why over the centuries 
political leaders have incorporated elements of religion and/or faith in their political 
campaigns and mobilization efforts.   However, examples of this dichotomy over the 
course of history show a varied spectrum to describe the relationship of the religious 
message and the actual political goal.  Taliban forces of Mohammed Omar best illustrate 
this phenomenon. In 1994, as Taliban influence moved across the Afghanistan landscape, 
                                                 
16 Pervez Musharraf, Sept. 28, 2004, resource online at 
www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx, accessed May 10, 2006. 
17 Speech by Chief Executive of Pakistan, CJCSC and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, 
Islamabad, October 17, 1999. 
12 
they had little reason to engage in battles.  Besides the common ethnic roots with the war 
lords the Taliban enjoined, Michael Griffin attributed their success on their “skilful 
manipulation of religious intoxication” left over from the 10-year war against invading 
Soviet forces.18   
It is this use, perhaps better described as “hijacking,” of a population’s religious 
convictions for the purpose of ensuring a political or power advantage that is so difficult 
for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s government to counter in the government’s 
quest for a moderate state.  Understanding how this practice became so acceptable, and 
thereby so reliable, is the first step to developing a strategy to neutralize its effects. 
In a book published in 1994, French political scientist Olivier Roy theorized that, 
“[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism makes it likely that Islam will 
long remain the dominant force in the mobilization of the Muslim world’s masses in 
times of crisis….”19  He further noted that the difference between modern-day Islamism 
and its influential precursors, as they pertain only to politics and the governing of the 
masses, is that the influence of religion is effective only through the conversion of the 
people to said religion; and since worldwide conversion of the individuals is not likely, 
Islamism – referring in this instance to political influence based on the stated interest of 
Islam – holds the unique position of perpetuating the “us versus them” mentality that is 
so necessary in defining an adversary.20   
In 1979, Mohammad Ayoob observed that the use of Islam as the motivating, 
legitimizing or mobilizing tool for political movements and leadership was prevalent, 
leading to the incorrect perception by outsiders that these misuses were part of the “same 
grand design” of Islam.21  The integration of Islam and political leadership is not the 
problem.  President Musharraf envisions a stable Pakistan that embraces Islam, in order 
to embody the Muslim character of Pakistan’s people.  Indirectly this vision counters the 
                                                 
18 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida and the Holy War, revised ed., 
(Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003), 12. 
19 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 6. 
20 Roy, 6. 
21 Mohammad Ayoob, “The Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared,” Asian Suvey 
19, no. 6 (June 1979), 535. 
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perception that Muslim populations are about militancy and intolerance.22  The problem 
Musharraf faces today is that his extremist opponents cite Islam as the motivating factor 
for their violent activities; when in fact their goals are for the survival of their own 
interpretation of Islam – a characteristic that bears striking resemblance to tribal identity 
power struggles elsewhere in the region – not for the future of the faith. 
 
B. ISLAM AND POLITICS – A HISTORY 
It is certainly no stretch to find examples of combining religion and politics in 
Islam’s history.  The Prophet himself took over an entire city and became a head of state.  
Eventually, neighboring Byzantine and Persian territories were taken over and 
incorporated into the Muslim state.23  Muhammad was asked early in his rule over 
Medina whether war was allowed against one’s neighbors.  At the time, Muhammad 
responded that it was not up to him to decide to wage war.  Fourteen years after the Hijra, 
the Prophet declared that whenever outsiders attacked or showed aggression against those 
who stated their allegiance to God, those being attacked were permitted to fight back.24 
The tradition of rule of the time supports the idea that outside aggressors would 
try to overrun nearby territories.  Medina had negotiated relationships with neighboring 
tribes, guaranteeing Medina’s support as long as the tribes agreed not to wage war on 
Medina.  Additionally, it secured the assistance and resources of those tribes in the event 
that Medina was challenged.25 
Eventually, Medina became the center of an expansive Muslim empire that 
stretched from Arabia to the West over North Africa, and to the East through Persia.  The 
rule over these areas was considered fair by the residents – citizens of conquered 
territories were not required to convert to Islam, and their local culture was maintained.  
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As long as the citizens accepted Muslim rule and agreed to pay a tax, they were given 
many other personal freedoms to live and worship as they chose.26 
This early example of faith tied to political gain, from most accounts, shows that 
though the empire was identified with the religion, in most matters religion and the 
conduct of state affairs was kept separate.  Battles were fought to ensure the continued 
right of Muslims to practice, and for the opportunity to spread the word of Allah to those 
who would listen.  It is just as easy to note, however, that very early in this evolution, 
leaders of these wars chose monetary and political gain in their conquests.  Their faith 
inspired them, but the personal rewards motivated them.27  This example illustrates that 
personal motivation can easily steer the believer in the wrong direction, regardless of any 
other intents.  It also demonstrates that as early as the time of the Prophet, the line 
separating the spread and practice of the faith from physical warfare was blurred.  
The importance of this thin line separating the faith of Islam from its politics lies 
in the reality that Islam is both faith and governance.  It is at the same time the guide for 
living the correct spiritual life, and the outline of the correct interaction between people.  
One cannot be complete when taken on its own, without consideration of the other. It is 
because of this combined nature of Islam that makes it so easy to blur the line between 
the two.  Historically, academic institutions have been a powerful tool for bringing 
Islamic communities together in the Indian subcontinent, but are another example of the 
ease with which whole communities can be swayed and the line between the two 
elements of Islam can be blurred.  
 
C. ISLAMIC ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
Some regions of Pakistan today suffer from ingrained permissive attitudes that 
allow modern charismatic personalities to commandeer the power of religious 
commitment as a means to mobilize the masses toward an end-state of political power.  
This attitude did not develop recently, but over the course of more than a century.   
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One of the most accepted establishments for the mobilization of Muslims in 
Pakistan is the madrasa.  Begun as religious schools to keep the traditions and practices 
consistent in the region, several of these schools became centers of influence for political 
movements from the height of British power in India until the Afghan-Soviet war of 
1979-89.  A brief look at these schools’ founding goals and political evolution sheds light 
on their influence in political life today. 
 
1. Deoband Madrasa 
One of the earliest schools established for the purpose of teaching Muslim 
students in the Indian Subcontinent is the Dar ul-Ulum of Deoband.  More commonly 
referred to simply as Deoband or the Deobandi School, the institution was established in 
1867.28  Although begun as an institution for structured learning, producing top religious 
advisors outside of the government system, the school became the launching point of 
many political – especially anti-British – mobilization movements.29  The emphasis in the 
structure was for each student to understand the interpretation the ‘ulama took of the 
Qur’an and the example set by the Prophet.  From that teaching, the students were 
expected to complete the school with a guide for how to live an ethical and moral life, by 
which they would serve as the example to those they sought to advise.30 
The format of the school’s administration broke molds when compared to that of 
other forms of learning of the day.  Most students around India were taught at home. 
Those educated elsewhere, particularly in matters of religion, usually studied one written 
work under a single tutor until that teacher felt the student had mastered the work.  The 
student then would find another teacher to study another reference.31  From the 
organizational structure imposed by the Mughal rulers, and the educational example 
provided by British schools, the founders of the Deoband madrasa were able to combine 
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experience to realize their goal of a unified institute of education that could produce a 
standard learned student from any region of the territory.32 
This process of acceptance regardless of regional origin posed unique problems 
for the school’s early administrators.  Under the traditional system, family-based 
instruction was governed by familial rules of conduct and hierarchy.  The varied family 
and regional histories of the Deoband students required a new system of rules to apply to 
everyone.  One of the founders, Maulana Muhammad Qasim, drafted eight fundamental 
principles for the initial members to follow so that the integration of students and teachers 
was focused on education and not on familiar or regional ranking.  Departments were 
formed to address different areas of student concern, such as appropriate behavior and 
discipline, official school judicial opinion, and the proscribed course of instruction.  Even 
the teachers were required to put aside their differences of opinion to allow their peers 
and students to express opposing views.33  
The Deoband madrasa set an enduring standard for its sources of funding as well.  
While some schools of the era simply formed and ran under funds already possessed by a 
region or a group, those funds eventually ran out, causing the schools to close as a result.  
Instead, all those associated with Deoband were required to solicit and encourage gifts of 
money or goods – such as books, food and furnishings – in exchange for recognition from 
the school.  While the students and faculty went about their tasks of securing these 
donations, the message of the school was spread around the regions as a result.  
Consequently, the influence of the school and the donations from around the regions built 
upon each other, until the Deoband madrasa was well known, well respected, and well 
financed.  This method proved so successful in the success of the school that it became 
the standard by which other madrasas gained funding.34 
Graduates of the successful Deoband program exemplified the founders’ visions 
during the years following their attendance.  The processes of intellectual debate and 
discussion the students practiced with each other – strangers at first, but always with 
someone of a differing opinion – taught the students valuable interpersonal skills that 
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carried into the political and professional environments.  Several students excelled in 
municipal management positions, and served as a single, consistent source of appropriate 
Islamic practice.35 The influence of the school on the surrounding population was a 
significant step in the evolution of Islamic political movements in northern India.   The 
very emphasis of the course of study at Deoband, Hadith, recounted and spread to the 
population, then influenced the views of Indian Muslims of the region. This led to a 
greater emphasis on stressing Hadith in society in the decades to follow.36 The idea of a 
centralized and structured school for the teaching and discussion of all of Islam proved so 
popular that by 1900, approximately 25 madrasas of the Deobandi tradition were 
established.37 
Part of the influence is still evident in today’s Pakistan.  The Deobandi madrasa 
stresses that Muslims have all the guidance for life they should want in the Qur’an and 
Hadith.  This has been interpreted by today’s Deobandis – about 15 percent of Pakistan’s 
Muslim population – that anything specifically excluded from these documents is 
therefore not allowed.  Technology is shunned, and so labeled as a way for the West to 
try to oppress Muslims.  In 1998, Deobandi Talibs began a campaign to close video rental 
stores and electronics retail shops in Balochistan.  Televisions, VCRs and satellite dishes 
were burned in the Northwest Frontier Province in 2000.38  This is quite an evolution 
from the school that instituted the earliest modern experiment in free and open academic 
debate nearly 150 years ago. 
 
2. Aligarh 
In addition to the Deoband madrasa’s products and influence, the format of the 
school itself stood as an inspiration for further development of organized institutions of 
study and debate. Where Deoband gave students a base in fundamentals of thinking and 
Islamic interpretation, the Anglo-Muhammadan College in Aligarh was founded in the 
1870s by Sayyed Ahmad Khan to provide Muslim students the education and skills to 
succeed as Muslims and professionals in the Western style of government established in                                                  
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India by the British. After the fall of the Mughals to the British influence, Muslims began 
to lose their prominence in Indian society. Business and governance were conducted in 
English, and positions at English schools were filled most often by Hindus of a society 
who could afford it.  Khan’s intent included his vision that the best way for Indian 
Muslims to succeed in the new Indian society was to maintain a Muslim identity, but to 
acquire a Western education.  A university that covered both of these elements of Indian 
Muslim needs proved the surest way to achieve this goal. 39,40  Although yet another 
institution was established at Lucknow under the same pretense as Aligarh, the Nadwat 
al-‘Ulama madrasa would not attain the same notoriety in the formation of the 
subcontinent following independence from British rule.  Aligarh would prove to be more 
than just an institution of higher training and learning.  Its alumni and faculty remained 
closely associated with the school, an environment that fostered active discussions about 
the future and politics of the state. 
 
3. Bareilly 
A combination of the previous movements can be found in the results of the 
Barelwi tradition, and its accompanying madrasa in Bareilly.  A Sufi tradition of Islam 
was developed into a guided tradition by Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi (1856-
1921).  Ahmad Riza called his group the Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jama’at, for “people of the 
[prophetic] way and the [majority] community,”41 a name taken from the Sunni identity 
of “people of the [prophetic] sunna and the majority.”42  The reference to the Sunni 
identity comes from Ahmed Khan’s Sunni religion, though other Sunnis reject his brand 
of Islam – particularly its Sufi origins – and choose to distance themselves simply by 
referring to the tradition as “Barelwi.”43 Interestingly, about 60 percent of Muslims in 
Pakistan today identify themselves with this tradition.44 Therefore, the tradition must 
have some element that speaks to so many people to have survived and succeeded until 
today. 
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The Barelwi tradition (as it will be called herein for simplicity) was developed 
from the written works of Ahmad Riza.  From a very young age, Ahmad Riza had been 
told by his grandfather – himself a sufi and a jurisconsult – and other ‘ulama from the 
village, that Ahmad Riza would grow to become a great Muslim scholar.  Although his 
late childhood coincided with the establishment of the madrasa at Deoband, Ahmad Riza 
was schooled at home by his father.45  Indeed, Ahmad Riza may be lucky to have 
received his education at home, since Maulana Rashid Ahmad, one of the original 
founders of the Deoband madrasa, did not believe in teaching “rational sciences” at the 
school.46 
As a result of an extensive and dedicated education from home, Ahmad Riza was 
considered a talented scholar, especially in Islamic law, as well as logic and math, while 
still a young man.  The interesting point about the tradition that emerged from Ahmad 
Riza’s thoughts is that first he acquired a following, and eventually a school was founded 
later in his life.47  The madrasas at Deoband and Aligarh, although created on the 
principles of their scholarly founders, first began teaching students, and later became 
centers of influence. This led to another difference in the movements:  the bases of the 
Deoband and Aligarh movements were students who came to learn at the institutions, 
eventually growing to adults who could continue to spread that influence.  Early 
followers of Barelwi were educated, upper-middle- to upper-class men.  A further 
distinction lies in their methods for attracting their first followers.  The madrasas called 
residents to the schools, and later used print and word of mouth to spread the message of 
their respective institutions.  Residents of nearby towns came to Ahmad Riza for 
guidance based on his reputation, regardless of the availability of other sufi pirs close 
by.48 
Finally, the teachings of Ahmad Riza that made his brand of Sufism unique 
centered on his view that a true Muslim must develop a personal relationship with the 
Prophet if his or her daily acts of faith were to account for anything.  Further, it seems his 
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beliefs of the Prophet can be compared to the way in which many Christians view Jesus.  
A belief that the Prophet was made aware of all knowledge, but instructed by Allah not to 
reveal certain things; that the Prophet was not just a man, but infallible and casting no 
shadow; that a believer must go through the Prophet if he wants to get to Allah, as a 
Christian believes that no one can get to God except through Jesus.49 Of course, as a sufi, 
Ahmad Riza agreed with the intervention of saints and pirs on behalf of the souls of 
Muslims – a belief that matches Catholicism – and referenced several works of previous 
scholars when making these assertions. This principle illustrates a distinct separation 
between the Deoband from the Bareilly tradition:  Deobandi interpretation strictly 
acknowledges that the Prophet was only a human.  Any reference likening Muhammad to 
God is against Islam, therefore blasphemous.50 
 
D. INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE TO POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE 
KHILAFAT MOVEMENT 
The impact that these schools had on the Muslim society of British India in the 
late 19th Century is telling, particularly in the way in which the madrasa at Deoband was 
a way to normalize the thinking and views of the community of Muslims in such a large 
area.  These schools became the most significant, accepted source of interpretation and 
influence of Islam for several generations of Muslim families during this period.  
Therefore, it is little wonder that the schools evolved into tools of mobilization for 
political causes with any ties to religious practice, freedoms, or jurisprudence. 
This trend of political influence soon produced many examples illustrating the 
ease in which such a powerful mobilization tool could overcome the power of the leaders, 
once the momentum for a cause had begun.  One cause in particular was a movement of 
the Muslims in India against oppression in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the 
Khilafat Movement.  It is perhaps in the outgoing and charismatic natures of its leaders, 
brothers Shaukat and Muhammad Ali, that both ensured the cause to be taken and to be 
pushed to its political limits.  The background of the Ali brothers nurtured more than 
ignited the natural tendencies of the men to throw them so whole-heartedly into a cause 
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for which there was neither success nor widespread support possible.  However, the final 
destination their cause would find was vastly different than the goals the brothers set 
forth to achieve, due in large part to the overwhelming momentum that religious fervor 
moves and unites the masses. 
 
1. The Turks and the Muslims 
Part of the significance of the Khilafat Movement and its players is the 
understanding of the regional political environment in which it was allowed to flourish.  
What the Ali brothers in particular did not understand was that the cause for which they 
lobbied so diligently was not the outcome desired by those Muslims looking to break 
from Ottoman influence. 
The authority of the Ottoman Empire as a caliph was actually a matter of question 
to some, though to others it was a matter of divine right.  In writing about the differences 
between Arabs and Turks in 1917, J.F. Scheltema wrote that besides the ethnic 
differences between the two groups, no Arab had reason to recognize the Turkish claim 
as a caliphate, and therefore had never viewed the Ottomans as such.  The empire was 
allowed to rule over the Hijaz for the simple reasons that it had gained control by power 
of might, and that ultimately the empire’s reach could not easily stretch to the lands of 
Mecca and Medina; in fact, real control of the land was left to be fought over by area 
families.51  
However, Leonard Binder writes that the ulama accorded Ottoman rulers 
legitimacy by way of their loyalty, rising to a respected position in the court in return.  
The authority of the sultan as the conqueror then justified his claim as the head of Islam, 
as the protector of the holy sites. The ulama refused to abandon their interpretation of 
Islamic law, which was irrefutable.52  Naturally, both interpretations have their merits, 
and the Ottoman sultanate controlled the lands of Hijaz with little opposition from 
outside the empire. 
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In a similar way, the Mughals of India tried to legitimize their empire as a 
caliphate.  Rulers in Delhi were recognized by the caliphs in Baghdad and Cairo, and in 
return swore their allegiance to the Abbasids.  They sustained their legitimacy until the 
British East India Company eventually gained control of the subcontinent in the mid-19th 
century, although some subordinate princes established relations with the Ottoman caliph 
directly.   These roots established for centuries between the Muslims of India and the role 
of the Ottoman sultan as the true caliphate grew deep, particularly once Mughal rule of 
India ended, leaving the Ottoman sultan as the only possible purveyor of Islam.53  
Therefore, the absolution of the caliphate should cause such activism in colonial India, at 
a time when Muslims were dealing with oppression and the inferiority of the political 
power of their religion. 
 
2. Mobilization from Academia 
The movement for Muslim political unity between the World Wars follows 
similar characteristics as many political activist campaigns in the United States in the 
1960s and ‘70s:  a strong mobilization stemmed from the universities.  The university at 
Aligarh was established by Sayyed Ahmad Khan in the 19th Century to modernize the 
Muslim youth with the tools they needed to compete in the colonized British India.  The 
early classes of graduates from the university at Aligarh exemplified the value of the 
Muslim university education by remaining active leaders as university trustees and 
prominent men of their societies. 54  By the early 20th Century, Aligarh had emerged as 
the nerve center of Muslim politics.  Aligarh leaders mobilized the population easily, 
usually in the name of the Indian Muslim as a permanent interest in national politics. 55  
Two of these graduate leaders were brothers Shaukat and Mohammad Ali.  
Early education at Bareilly and the institutions and influence of Aligarh College 
instilled in the Ali brothers that Indian Muslims had fallen from the leadership they once 
had, and that they could rally under the communal spirit of Aligarh College to regain that 
glory.  The ideology of Sayyid Ahmad Khan inspired them to try to bring together the 
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whole Indian Muslim community.56 After their graduation from Aligarh, the Ali brothers 
each found work in the public sector, but each also continued to support the college.  In 
the early 1900s, Mohammad wrote in the Times of London supporting Aligarh.57  He also 
engaged in political activity, writing in opposition to the British rule in India. 58    
Muhammad and Shaukat Ali became much more serious in politics in 1907.   
Shaukat Ali competed with his former classmate Aftab Ahmad Khan.  To counter Aftab’s 
influence, the brothers established a parallel organization, complete with a publication. 59   
The new association resulted in an increased alumni membership of 1912 nearly four 
times the membership in 1907.60  This experience kept the Ali brothers closer to Aligarh 
and its influence, the one common goal they shared with Aftab.  Their differences, 
however, led the brothers to envision expansion not only of the university’s scope, but of 
the political ideology they had learned there.  
In the meantime, another organization in which the brothers would participate and 
which would influence their political activism was established, also holding its 
headquarters at Aligarh.  One key issue of the All-Indian Muslim League, inspired by the 
ideology of Aligarh, was that though it formed for the promotion of Muslim participation 
and representation in the government, it did so under a pro-British platform.  Muhammad 
identified with this vision, in that ideologically he was strongly Muslim, though 
politically he supported Indian nationalism.61 
 
3. Indian Muslim Politics 
The activities surrounding Aligarh notwithstanding, politics for the average 
Muslim in India under British rule caused hardships and created a rift in Hindu-Muslim 
relations.  Although no British plan existed for favoritism of one group over another, 
when political power is left uncheck – especially at the lowest levels – personal interests 
and desires make their way into the framework.  The united provinces of India could not 
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avoid such misuses, which caused a major rift in sectarian relationships throughout the 
nation. 
By 1910, decentralization was instituted for the municipal governance system in 
India.  The abuses of the system were addressed, including a standardized tax code, and 
guaranteed electorates for Muslims in some areas, although Hindu sectarianism still 
prevailed in others.  Within six years, the central government conceded separate 
representation. 62  At the same time, Muslims were looking to regain their share of the 
power in India, from the national government down to the provinces and municipalities.63  
Ultimately, Muslims felt as if they needed to use the control they had in local government 
positions to safeguard the future of their religion and their religious society.64  The 
political influence of Aligarh College was brought to bear, with Sayyed Ahmad Khan 
personally, and the Aligarh political machine collectively, including the Muslim League, 
working against this imbalance.65  
Among these sectarian political battles, the Khilafat Movement found its 
beginnings.  The First World War forced the Ali brothers to split from the Muslim 
League to take on a new mission.  The League had been established and continued to 
operate under the vision that all of India should be united under British rule, but that 
Indians of all religions should have representation.  The promulgation of Islam, on the 
other hand, led the brothers to adopt a pro-Turkey stance, since the Ottoman sultanate 
was the last symbol of Islamic unity as a recognized caliphate.  When the Ottoman 
Empire began to intimate anti-British leanings in early 1914, the Alis had to make a 
choice.  Muhammad Ali tried to keep the nations of his two loyalties together, first by 
arranging for messages to the Turkish foreign minister and the caliph, urging them to 
maintain a neutral stance during the war, then by publishing articles outlining the 
justification for Turkish dissatisfaction with the British Empire.  By the end of the year, 
however, Turkey and Great Britain were at war, and the colonial government could not 
afford to have established pro-Turkey politicians among the population at-large.  The 
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Alis and several other activists like them were then interned, and eventually incarcerated, 
for the remainder of the war.66 
 
4. The Khilafat Movement 
By the time of the Ali brothers’ release from prison, the Muslim League was 
involved with several political issues.  The issue of the Turkish Caliphate was one, but it 
wasn’t the most important on the League’s agenda.  Eventually, the Muslim League made 
the Britain-Turkey debate a frontline issue.  Although the League remained loyal to Great 
Britain on political grounds, members clearly felt that the Caliphate issue was of a serious 
personal nature to Indian Muslims.  The unique issue here, however, is that though the 
Khilafat Movement was initiated as a matter of future Muslim security, its anti-British 
nature made it a key issue to unite Indians for their fight for independence from the 
British Empire. 67,68  The ultimate deciding factor would be the way in which this 
political opposition was waged.  
The Ali brothers finally had their say during a convention of the Congress, the 
League, the All-Indian Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat al-Ulama in December of 
1919.  Shaukat Ali led the Khilafat Committee session, from which came a resolution to 
defy the government in order to defend Islam, should the government enact peace terms 
with Turkey that were counter to Islamic tenant.  The weakness of this resolution, 
however, was its ambiguity of the actions the members would take should such a peace 
agreement be made.69 
From this point on, the Ali brothers led the charge for the Khilafat Movement.  
They represented the movement in meetings with the viceroy in India and to leaders in 
England.  Their campaign and popularity spread throughout India, as the representatives 
of the voice for the survival of Islam. As the movement claimed to speak for the caliphate 
as the defender of all Islam, the Alis presumed to represent all Muslims, not just those in 
India.  The implication was that Great Britain could count on their support in the 
settlement of disagreements in other Muslim lands, though neither brother understood the                                                  
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situation in Arab countries.  In arguing for all Ottoman Muslims to remain under caliph 
control, Muhammad Ali was in essence asking for the Arabs to remain under the rule of 
the Turks.70 
Eventually the momentum achieved by the Khilafat movement had little chance to 
succeed in the goal for which it was begun, and it is here that the religious fervor that 
began the movement was diverted to a slightly different political goal.  Realizing that the 
Khilafat Committee’s goal of the sultanate retaining power was slipping away in Turkey, 
Muhammad Ali began to limit his comments to the desires of Muslims in India.  
Gandhi’s non-cooperation plan was taking hold all over India, and producing its desired 
results against the British.  Muhammad extended this plan to apply to Muslims, couching 
his call in the form of a jihad – if the British would not enhance Muslim influence, then 
the Muslims must commit to the Indian plan to secure the power for themselves.71  While 
maintaining a religious goal, the momentum of the movement was shifted to cater to 
whatever Muhammad Ali chose.  
Ultimately, Muhammad’s shift from Turkish goals to Indian goals secured his 
status as a leader in India.  By the end of 1920, the Ottoman Empire retired to its 
permanent place in the history books.  Instead of accepting defeat, Muhammad simply 
modified the group’s goals.  He continued his rhetoric on the survival of Islam under a 
caliphate, but switched the focus on the strength of Islam in India.72  With the change of 
focus to the plight of Muslims in India, the Ali brothers found their niche.  The earlier 
focus on the future of the Turkish Caliphate really only served to mobilize support and 
create a bond that all Muslims could be convinced to join, but the movement ended as a 
political force that guaranteed continued political influence of its leaders.  From this, 
society came to accept the practice of politicians rallying support for their political 
aspirations under the guise of the survival of the faith of Islam.  This practice would 
evolve into the idea that any element of political life that specifically did not reference 
the promulgation of faith, could be labeled as policies against the spiritual aspects of 
Islam.  Essentially, if a policy is not written to promote spiritual faith, then it is 
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automatically identified as opposing faith.  These are the ideals against which modernity 
struggles. 
 
E. MUSLIM SEPARATIST MOVEMENT TO PARTITION 
The partition of India in 1947 serves as the most powerful example of the history 
that religion and politics, particularly for the mobilization of the population, has been 
seen as necessary and effective, and has survived throughout Pakistan’s existence.  Since 
Pakistan was formed as a home for Muslims, it is reasonable to expect that political 
parties trying to further the interests of the population would base their platform on the 
Islamic character of those interests.  However, it is the abuse of that religious aspect to 
further a goal that is really only political that has become the characteristic that is 
difficult for Musharraf to counter. 
The British Cabinet Mission of 1946, sent to India with absolutely no plan of 
transition, presented an entire governmental structure blueprint only one month after 
arrival.  The Cabinet Mission’s goal was to facilitate the transition to self-rule, but with 
the understanding that the independent India would be a united one.  When no 
agreements could be reached, within two more months, the blueprint was revised, 
debated and restructured to the point that an entirely different outcome was prescribed. 73, 
74 
It is within this climate, with decisions and proposals changing even before they 
can be announced or understood, that the many strong and visionary personalities were 
able to effect small adjustments toward their goals.  Their competing goals, however, 
played off of each other to further the sectarian divide.  Congress President Jawaharlal 
Nehru (1889-1964), needed only to comment in the abstract on the National Congress’ 
ability to amend the agreements as Congress saw fit during the conduct of the Constituent 
Assembly.75  His statement may have been simply regarding the composition of the 
interim government, or he may have intended for the implication of further changes to 
resonate through the press.  Regardless of Nehru’s intent, after good-faith negotiation and 
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compromise, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), member of Congress and president of 
the Muslim League, took Nehru’s comments as a sign that Indian Muslims were to be 
subject to the unchecked whims of a Hindu-majority National Congress once again.  
Previously, Jinnah had been in opposed to any partition, believing that religious 
differences would be set aside and all people of India could and should strive for one 
independent nation.  However, Nehru’s comments were the final factor that convinced 
Jinnah that India’s sectarian divide could be promulgated by a post-independent 
Congress, and gave the legitimacy to his later claim that the subcontinent should be 
divided in order to provide Muslims at least one new nation of their own.76 
At the same time, a highly educated Muslim journalist, Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-
A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979), who had participated in Indian Muslim political movements 
since the Khilafat Movement, established a slightly different view of political Islam.  
After a short time as a newspaper editor for the Jamia’at-i Ulama-i Hind, or the Party of 
the Indian Ulama, Mawdudi set off to launch his own political movement, based on the 
belief that a strong Muslim political structure would unite Muslims of India, and serve to 
reinvigorate the practice of Islam among the population.  The Jama’at-i Islami was 
established in 1941, led by Mawdudi until he retired in 1972, and held the premise that 
the communal Islamic leadership had the responsibility to outline a standard of living and 
practice to serve as an example to the citizens, thereby creating a tighter, righteous 
Muslim community.  From here, the influence would spread across to Arabia, bringing 
Muslims back to a more pure way of living and practicing Islam.77   
The point of this group’s establishment at this time, along side the existent 
Muslim League, and the emphasis on Islamic parties in Pakistan’s politics, illustrates the 
foundation of the intertwined relationship between religion and politics from the creation 
of Pakistan.  The vision of the moderates as it opposed that of these elements for a purely 
religious future of Pakistan has its origins here.  Today, these two political visions still 
compete for the right to define Pakistan’s identity. 
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F. MODERN DAY RELIGIOUS-BASED POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 
Deobandi tradition has been characterized by two identities here.  First, as a 
school of thought that expected and elicited free discussion about interpretations of the 
Qur’an and the Hadith, as was the case when the school and tradition were founded in the 
19th Century.  More recently, its followers have been portrayed more along the path seen 
in Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia: the violent rejection of all things technological, Western 
and modern.  Both descriptions are accurate, but must be applied to the correct time in 
history.  The drastic shift from one extreme, literally to another, did not happen on its 
own.  The environment of Pakistan and influences from surrounding nations not only 
played a large part in this change, but affected several other organizations and social 
movements in similar ways.   These events and movements each played off of each other, 
needing only the smallest nudges by the right personalities to create the state seen today. 
Author Michael Griffin provides an excellent illustration of this process.  In 
describing Mullah Mohammad Omar’s successful campaign across Afghanistan 
following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Griffin offers a reason for Omar’s success.  
Although its leaders fought with the mujahedin, the actual fighting force Omar’s Taliban 
militia was comprised of students with little or no battle experience, leaving their strength 
and potential in question.  Many in Kabul discounted the approaching force, thinking it 
had neither the experience nor the fortitude to attempt a takeover of the seat of 
government.  However, the militia acquired the loyalty of most of the major regions by 
other means of coercion:  tribal leaders were more trusting of the Taliban, as it was a 
band ethnically the same as the tribes; well-negotiated sums of money were offered; but 
mostly, as Griffin describes, the Taliban militia gained its popular following by way of a 
“skilful manipulation of religious intoxication.”78  It was the small adjustments of the 
way Afghans saw the world that made the final push to Kabul simpler for Omar.  First he 
established a common bond of ethnicity, implying that his goals were their goals.  Those 
who could not relate to Omar on these grounds could be persuaded by the resources to 
feed and clothe their tribes.  Finally, the one element of a person’s life that holds the most 
power is his faith.  By tapping that resource of passion that had already been stirred by 
the previous war, Omar was able to bend Afghan minds to his way of thinking. 
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Mullah Omar’s campaign should have been very predictable to Kabul and 
elsewhere.  The same influence had been used to raise public and international support 
for the ferocious war against Soviet invaders in 1979.  Indeed, even regional events 
leading up to the invasion by Soviet forces set a pliable stage for extreme influence, 
presented very convincingly with religious rhetoric in Islamic costume.   
 
1. Pakistan’s Domestic Politics – 1971-1977 
The school at Deoband, its alumni, and the subsequent satellite madrasas around 
Pakistan, were founded on the belief that governments should be questioned and 
challenged when the needs of the society were not addressed.  When Zulfikar Bhutto 
proved to be more dictator than democrat, he should have anticipated rapid formation of 
opposition groups.  His alienation of the military; the  of strong dissenting political 
personalities; and the disenfranchisement of large sections of the population, simply on 
the basis of their form of religious practice; set Bhutto up for mass opposition. His 
continued antics that proved beneficial to him but detrimental to the country provided the 
motive. Finally in 1977, Bhutto’s hunger for power came to a point.  Elections were 
announced, scheduled so Bhutto’s plans to consolidate ultimate power to the presidency 
could be accomplished under a rule-of-law legitimacy. 79   
What Bhutto failed to anticipate was the organization of his political opponents 
with the single goal of seeing Bhutto out of office.  These parties joined their forces, 
thereby consolidating all opponents of Bhutto, regardless of the issue.  This Pakistan 
National Alliance (PNA) survived the rigged election and its subsequent political fight.  
Bhutto’s efforts to employ the military failed, as its chairman, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, 
opposed Bhutto for his own reasons. With the full weight of the military behind him, Zia 
finally agreed to step in to the post that soon was vacated by Bhutto.80 
The significance of Zia’s rise to power in 1977 lies in the basis for his opposition 
to Bhutto.  It was not Bhutto’s claims to ultimate authority, or his failed land reform 
initiatives that offended Zia.  Instead, it was what Zia considered Bhutto’s decidedly anti-
Islamic actions that convinced Zia of Bhutto’s failure to Pakistan.  From 1977, 
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Mohammed Zia ul-Haq intended to put Pakistan back on the track of what he considered 
not just a homeland for Muslims, but an Islamic state.81 
Once religion was brought back into the mainstream of Pakistani politics, the 
general direction of the course had been set.  Muhammad Qasim Zaman noted in 1998 
that for the vulgarly dissenting personality, today’s “print culture” provides a ready 
environment for a perceived or imagined threat to bloom into a newly realized sectarian 
identity.82  The drivers who would later steer so many toward religious extremism had 
only to wait for external influences to narrow the course, and advertise anything that 
could be interpreted as a threat to the society. Of course, Pakistan’s domestic 
environment comprised of more factors than just religion, but these will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
2. External Influences 
Outside of Pakistan, religiously inspired political movements gained even more 
momentum.  The failure of Mohammed Reza Shah’s rule in Iran sparked a theocratic 
rally that evolved into a full revolution by the end of the decade.  Soviet influence in 
Kabul resulted in a massive invasion of Afghanistan.  Characteristics of both events are 
said to have spurred ultra conservative Saudi Arabian Wahhabists to divert extensive 
wealth to madrasas in Pakistan for the final push of politically active Islam to that of 
extremist ideology.  The only problem is that while this notion is accepted as fact, little 
evidence can be found to substantiate the claim.  In 2001, New York Times reporter 
Thomas Friedman noted a placard on the wall of the Haqqinaya Madrasa – the school 
where Omar and many other Taliban leaders studied – that reads simply, “''A gift of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”83  A U.S. Congressional Research Service report also notes 
that a Saudi Embassy spokesman denies Saudi government support directly to extremist 
madrasas, as that activity ‘goes against our policy.’  The report goes on to note, “to date, 
there are no published reports on the aggregate amount of funding which has been 
donated from inside Saudi Arabia to specifically support the building of madrasas 
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worldwide.”84  Essentially, the support is considered common knowledge, but details of 
this support – such as the extent of funding or influence over curricula – cannot be 
verified. 
Zaman adds, however, that the success of a madrasa, usually closely associated 
with a strictly defined sectarian organization, spurs the establishment of more such 
institutions; thereby perpetuating the sectarian ideology within its own momentum.  He 
also notes that the growth of such madrasas in Pakistan is coincidentally linked to 
sectarian conflict.85   
A large number of madrasas in Pakistan today label themselves Deobandi, 
because of historic links to the original Dar al-Ulum madrasa in Deoband.  As noted 
before, this tradition saw the birth of approximately 25 new schools within 50 years of 
the parent institution.  In the more than 100 years since, however, separate movements 
under the Deobandi identity umbrella have developed, until the term “Deobandi” has 
come to represent a strict, narrowly interpreted extreme form of Sunni – not exactly the 
open, Sufi-dominated force in free discussion of the original school.86 
Another influence on this trend of Islamic political mobilization was the Afghan-
Soviet War (1979-1989).  Former Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin provided a radically 
understated foreshadow of the Islamic resistance to Soviet influence in Afghanistan 
when, in March 1979, he told Afghan communist heavyweight Nur Mohammed Taraki 
that “Afghanistan’s rising Islamic rebellion… presented ‘a complex political international 
issue.’”87  This proved true not only for the Soviet Union, but the echoes of resounding in 
the aftermath of the movement would affect dozens of countries, Muslim and otherwise, 
for several decades. 
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Kosygin may have anticipated the powerful draw Islam would have over the 
citizens of Afghanistan, but the country’s tribal history gave little clue.  Although three 
previous attempts to conquer Afghanistan ultimately failed, the predominant force 
seemed to be tribal conflict.  What Moscow could not imagine was that regardless of 
deep-seeded tribal conflict, Islam was the one element that could unite Afghans against 
an invader – especially one that espoused atheism.  The adjacent Islamic revolution in 
Iran certainly added fuel to the fire of resistance.88   
Said Amir Arjomand quotes political theorist Max Weber to describe the tension 
between the state and the hierocracy: “Since political power claims a competing charisma 
of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan.”89 
Barbara Metcalf writes that “the Taliban emerged as a local power in Afghanistan 
starting in 1994 because they were able to provide protection and stability in a context of 
warlordism, raping, and corruption.”90 Once the Soviet threat was conquered, tribal 
factions divided Afghanistan again.  The only way to establish a stable, unified 
Afghanistan was to go back to the one thing with which almost every Afghan could 
identify:  Islam.  It was the one element that made Omar the most credible, allowing his 
campaign across Afghanistan to take hold and succeed.  In war-weary Afghanistan, the 
people were simply too tired of war and conflict to worry about the details. 
The Afghan-Soviet War had special implications for Pakistan.  Iran not only was 
busy with its own revolution, but it was a Shi’a revolution.  The majority of Afghans 
were Sunni, as were most Pakistanis.  Many Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan, 
flooding border-area madrasas with Afghan students and straining Pakistani 
infrastructure.  Additionally, as the United States had convinced Saudi Arabia to 
contribute as much money to the ousting of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Saudi 
Wahhabists found their niche in the rapidly growing enrollment of the Deobandi 
madrasas of Pakistan.  It was easy for Zia to influence these madrasas for the 11 years of 
his rule, eventually turning their teaching of Islam into one closer to his radical brand.  It 
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was then an easy jump from there to the Wahhabi influence coming in to harvest this crop 
of new graduates for the Afghan jihad.91 The shared identity and religious ties between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan identified at the beginning of the war would bind the two 
countries together for two more decades. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
At least one consideration must be made when analyzing attempts at 
modernization and enlightenment of Muslim nations today.  The Westphalia model 
cannot be used as a template, to be followed exactly, hoping for successful transition.  
Too many variables are changed: close interaction with and influence by many different 
cultures around the world have made the environment markedly different from that of 
Renaissance Europe; and the cultural histories of areas and peoples such as those in 
Southwest Asia immediately ensure that changes must come in different packages, over 
long periods of time, if they are expected to take hold.  The distinct separation of religion 
and politics was appropriate and effective for Western societies, but has proven 
disastrous for Muslim countries.  If this single issue is accepted, and a new way to 
modernity can be realized with politics and religion influencing societies together, then 
the question becomes how to achieve a successful parallel relationship while preventing 
the misuse of religious motivation for the purpose of political gain.   
Historically, the line dividing religious commitment and political hijacking has 
been thin, and the influence needed to move a population from one goal to another was 
slight.  Though very short-lived in its influence, the Khilafat Movement would not have 
been the force in mobilization had it not been for the charismatic leadership of 
Muhammad and Shaukat Ali.  Unfortunately, the cause of the Ottoman Caliphate was 
merely a symbol behind which the movement mobilized, but it did rally the Muslims of 
all parts of India to join the political process in the security of their future rights.  In the 
struggle for independence from British rule, regardless of the outcome, influences of the 
Bareilly and Deoband madrasas, Aligarh University, and religiously based political 
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movements such as the Khilafat Movement, the tie between Islam and political 
mobilization found its roots.  
The most significant result of the Khilafat Movement in the politics of the 
everyday Muslim of the Indian subcontinent was to establish the idea that any political 
campaign could be waged if the slightest connection could be drawn to the differing 
opinions of religious identity.  The masses can be mobilized for the furtherance of a 
political goal if they believe that goal will counter any perceived injustice, or even to 
counter a difference of religious interpretation.  Unfortunately, this form of mass 
mobilization opens the door for widespread misuse.  With the very personal place that 
religion holds in most people, emotion often becomes the driving factor over reason, 
giving way for unethical, corrupt or simply unqualified leadership to gain power.  
Compounding this sectarian political mobilization was the ultimate partition of 
India following the departure of the British in 1947.  For several decades, Hindu and 
Muslim groups had used their religious differences as excuses for varied political gains.  
The final act was the establishment of a separate Muslim nation.  Although the 
establishment of Pakistan for its founder was simply to ensure religious freedom without 
fear of political oppression, the idea of Pakistan evolved into the ideology that Pakistan 
was created to establish an Islamic state; yet another instance of cashing in power 
garnered by the propaganda of faith in attempts to gain power in the ruling government. 
This legitimacy of mobilization was strengthened further by a war several decades 
later between Muslims of Afghanistan, reinforced with religiously motivated fighters 
from these madrasas and their alumni from surrounding countries, against the armies of 
the Soviet Union.  The popular momentum that ensued was fueled by a decade of 
“righteous” rhetoric touting the defenders of Islam, facilitated the growth of anti-
communist sentiment as well.  This provided the unique scenario for opportunistic, 
radical religious personalities to bend the paths of the religious population and the school 
system established to promote religious debate, to a path of extremism, and the misuse of 
religion for the attainment of power. 
Well before the idea of Pakistan existed, the harmonious weaving of religion and 
politics was easily misused and eventually warped to the hijacking of religious 
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commitment for political power.  With so much altruistic intent, intermixed with such a 
corruption, the people of Pakistan have come to see the lines blurred when religion is 
used for social mobilization.  As Musharraf tries to counter the negative political misuse 
of religion, he has to take great care not to appear to be oppressing entirely religious 
participation in governance.  It took more than 150 years to establish such a system, so to 
correct its path will also take some time. Were this the only negative issue, a simple plan 
may be devised at least to set Pakistan on a path toward moderation with little effort.  
However, this is but one aspect of the issue.  Other very strong forces are in play, which 
make Enlightened Moderation a long, uphill battle. 
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III. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON PAKISTAN DOMESTIC 
CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICS: THE CASES OF INDIA, 
SAUDI ARABIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE UNITED STATES 
“The prospect of a nuclear-armed Pakistan adopting the credo of the 




In the study of International Relations, interaction between two states is usually 
observed only in the vacuum of the bilateral relationship, with little or only token 
reference to the influence of other actors on the system as a whole.  The same can be said 
when looking at the influence that a nation’s interactions have had on its domestic 
politics and society.  The influences of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia on 
each other’s political paths are at times intertwined – the relationship between two often 
affected a third, and sometimes fourth.  In one chaotic example – the invasion of 
Afghanistan by Soviet forces – all four of these nations, plus several others, were directly 
involved in each other’s domestic environments so closely that it can be difficult to 
separate one nation’s influence over another’s.  Additionally, the United States at times 
has exerted geo-political influence on Pakistan, though the effects have been less direct. 
In order to understand the environment in which Pakistan’s president Pervez 
Musharraf must work in his goal for successful economic and social development in 
Pakistan, a look at Pakistan’s neighborhood and its international influences is essential.  
These relationships not only have shaped the landscape of Pakistan’s domestic character; 
they continue to influence the way in which Pakistani society reacts to domestic change. 
The four countries that have affected Pakistan most notably since its creation have been 
its neighbors India and Afghanistan; regional power Saudi Arabia; and the last global 
superpower, the United States. Going back to the sake of simplicity, however, the 
influences of these four states on the domestic environment of Pakistan will be addressed 
separately in general, with allowances made for other sources of influence. 
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B. INDIA 
 Regardless of any other alliances or relationships Pakistan does or must 
maintain, one neighbor nation always stays at the forefront of Pakistan’s foreign policy.  
The issues that have gone unresolved since Pakistan’s split from India have festered, and 
have led to further issues between the two nations.  Unresolved territorial disputes, the 
division of government assets and the tragic memories from the mass migration of 
hundreds of millions of citizens remain in the minds Pakistani citizens and government 
leaders. Walter Anderson opined that contemporary Indian foreign policy is drafted under 
the pretext that India is seen predominantly in the context of the Indo-Pakistani 
relationship, illustrating the close influence India and Pakistan have had on each other’s 
history.93  In the simple words of Stephen Philip Cohen, “From the Indian perspective, 
negotiations with Pakistan will always be difficult.”94  This sentiment is equally 
applicable for Pakistan’s perspective of India. Additionally, the history between the two 
countries is easily accessed, keeping India’s impact on Pakistani society negative, 
regardless of any progress.95 
Relations between India and Pakistan – indeed relations between any two 
countries – are not exclusive in the affects the two nations have on each other.  Issues 
between India and Pakistan are impacted by each nation’s relations with other countries.  
A case in point is that of China’s impact on Indo-Pakistan relations.  China and India 
have engaged in continuous opposition over the subject of border identification for much 
of their histories.  When China gained nuclear weapons capability, India set out to 
develop one of its own.  Once India successfully tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, both 
China and Pakistan placed Indian relations at a higher priority, each for their own 
disagreements with India.  China saw Pakistan as a mutual adversary to India at the time, 
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therefore China agreed to help once Pakistan stepped up its efforts to develop its own 
nuclear technology.96 
In the same light, Pakistan’s assistance to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion 
put India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union into neat 
categories, where Southwest Asia nations fell into camps supported either by the Soviet 
Union or United States.  Afghanistan and Pakistan were on the side of the Americans, 
while India was seen by the West on the side of the Soviets.97  This simple identification 
of India and Pakistan on opposite sides of an international struggle set the stage for 
subsequent international alliances to be seen from the beginning in particular relief. 
An interesting theory on the effects India has on Pakistan’s domestic environment 
is the claim that Pakistan needs its distrust of India to unite Pakistanis around a common 
goal.  Mismanagement or delays in the division of state assets at Partition, as well as the 
conflicts surrounding Kashmir and later Bangladesh are issues that politicians can readily 
access to support efforts to rally Pakistanis for government support.98  However, two 
wars with India since Partition – 1965 and 1971 – as well as an uprising in Kashmir, 
emphasize that the problems between the neighbors have yet gone unresolved.  
Due to their shared history and heritage, tensions between these two countries are 
heightened.  Similarities in daily living and cultural traditions make India and Pakistan 
natural rivals – each wanting to establish itself as a separate and distinguishable entity 
apart from the other.  The differing characteristics of the two governments is especially of 
note; the way in which Pakistan’s governance has evolved – strong military involvement 
and governmental decisiveness – can make the government in New Delhi feel 
encumbered by a more structured and bureaucratic process. However, this very process 
under which India operates is exactly what keeps its identity relatively stable. 
The most recent, and the most salient, case in point was illustrated during what 
became known as the Kargil crisis. India found itself in a unique position when general 
elections failed to produce a working government in 1999, leaving the presidency in 
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place, but with no parliament to ratify its decisions.  This “caretaker government” was 
bound by the same article of India’s constitution, stating that a president could only 
decide policy when backed by the parliament.99  While Indian political leaders felt that 
the stability of the system could allow for this unexpected development, one eventuality 
with India’s natural rival challenged India’s perceptions. 
Earlier that year, in February 1999, then-Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee traveled to Lahore to meet with Nawaz Sharif for a political summit, in an 
attempt to open discussions on some of the issues that had kept Indo-Pakistani relations 
tense.  The summit faced criticism from many sides, including factions that denounced 
both leaders’ participation.  Religious-based parties such as Jama’at-i Islami and Jamiat-i 
Ulama-i Islam felt that poor Indian treatment of Kashmiris made Vajpayee’s participation 
false; and Sharif’s participation too conciliatory to India.100 
Despite the opposition, the summit seemed to give most citizens some hope that 
the two nations might move toward resolutions at least to some of their differences.  
Unfortunately, the progress made in public opinion was dashed when the Indian 
government was struggling to reform later that year, and forces backed by Pakistan 
crossed the Line of Control to occupy Indian-held territory in the Kargil sector of 
Kashmir.  India responded with decisive force, but kept the battlefield limited to the 
section in Kargil directly affected by the intrusion.  While the crisis lasted only a few 
months, more than 1,000 deaths were reported on both sides.  It was not until the United 
States pressured Sharif to move Pakistani troops back across the Line of Control.101 
Besides the conflict itself, several other elements of this crisis proved unsettling to 
New Delhi.  First, that the decision to expel the intrusion in Kashmir could not be made 
so easily, despite the establishment of seemingly specialized organization of government 
functions.  The newly established National Security Council had yet to feel its authority 
enough to act without Parliament, and the National Integration Council also could have 
taken the lead to devise an appropriate response, but its exclusion only served to highlight 
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a political trend to defer to the highest authority – in this case the unformed 
government.102  While India’s bureaucratic governmental system should instill 
confidence in its stability, the Kargil crisis instilled jealousy that Pakistan’s more flexible 
governing system – though unstable and ever-changing – could move so much more 
quickly on issues of national importance.103  The coup that found Musharraf in the office 
of the chief executive did not reduce Indian concerns over the governance issue.  While 
Sharif was credited with the responsibility of the incursion at Kargil, Musharraf is seen as 
the military leader who planned, and likely instigated the operation.  Any plans 
Musharraf presents to India with regard to the solution to the Kashmir problem, therefore, 
is looked on with the same suspicion of hypocrisy as Vajpayee was accused at the Lahore 
summit.104 
Of all issues remaining between India and Pakistan, the most lasting and 
seemingly most contentious is this case of Kashmir.  No Pakistani political leader has 
dared to offer a compromise for fear of losing the support of Muslims in Kashmir, 
particularly fearing violent opposition of militant extremists.105  As noted previously, 
even attempts to cool tensions are met with criticism and skepticism, along with lingering 
issues of distrust between the governments over the motivation of any overtures. 
Besides the perpetuation of distrust between the two nations, the wars, smaller 
military actions, and several separate incidents in Kashmir have produced one 
consequence that India has used to its advantage.  Alexander Evans wrote in 2002, “The 
threat of force against Pakistan can deliver diplomatic dividends for India.”106 If the 
Kargil incident proved anything, it was that outside political pressures, not Indian force, 
resulted in the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. Evans’ observation also came after India 
had tried in 2001 to work out its own deals with militant organizations in Pakistan-
controlled areas of Kashmir.  When cease-fire agreements with Hizb ul-Mujahideen 
failed to produce results, thereby disproving Evans’ point, India announced it would 
revert to its previous stance of offensive action in the region. India also tried to use the 
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political arena to soften its image with regard to Pakistan by arranging a meeting with 
Musharraf.  While the visit worked wonders for Musharraf’s position on the international 
stage, India was left with little to show for its efforts.107  Ultimately, it was the activities 
of al Qaeda later in the same year that gave India its chance to show itself as the polar 
opposite of Pakistan in order to garner favor from the West; as well as the chance to show 
the United States that India was its strategic partner in the region, thereby opening the 
door for further relations between India and the West.  
Although some suggest that Pakistanis make more of Indian hostility than actually 
exists, the immediate reaction of India following the attacks on the United States in 2001 
indicate that India was at the end of its proverbial rope with regard to international 
options. India quickly seized the opportunity to divert some international attention to 
Pakistan-based terrorism, particularly in Pakistan-controlled regions of Kashmir, where al 
Qaeda was alleged to have established training camps. The time Indian officials spent in 
Kashmir with Hizb ul-Mujahideen earlier in the year would have provided just enough 
evidence to support this claim. Additionally, India was quick to offer use of its bases to 
the United States for the purpose of launching attacks against the Taliban.108 
Additionally, India took the further step to paint a picture of Pakistan that matched that of 
the Taliban government.109 
Two events that kept India in Pakistan’s affairs for the rest of 2001 and onward 
both were said to have originated from Pakistan.  The first was an attack October 1 on the 
legislative assembly in Indian-held Kashmir.  While initial claim for this attack was made 
by a Pakistan-based militant group, the claim was later recounted.  India was prepared to 
move into Pakistan in pursuit of those responsible.  The United States initially asked 
Pakistan and India to set aside their differences while the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan 
was ongoing.  By the end of the month, Indo-U.S. relations had progressed as the Taliban 
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was quickly falling, and India eased its rhetoric against Pakistan.  Only two months later, 
several armed attackers attempted to detonate explosives in the Indian parliament 
building while Parliament was in session.  India immediately accused two militant groups 
from Pakistan for the attack, and claimed evidence proving these groups’ ties to ISI 
support.  U.S. intervention eased the tensions between the two countries, but Indian 
forces were deployed to the Pakistani border nonetheless.  Pakistan responded in kind, 
and by the end of the year hostilities across the Kashmiri Line of Control were reported, 
in conjunction with the recall of diplomats and cessation of travel across the border.110  
While Pakistan was having to deal with yet more refugees from Afghanistan, the 
disapproval from extremist Islamic organizations within Pakistan, and American 
assertions that al Qaeda and Taliban elements were hiding in Pakistan’s rural tribal areas, 
Musharraf had yet another incident with India right on the border. 
Unfortunately for India, yet fortunately for Musharraf and Pakistan, India’s 
assistance was not as vital to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan as was Pakistan’s.  The 
basic element was that Pakistan actually bordered Afghanistan, but it was a distinct 
advantage to the United States that Pakistan had more intelligence on Afghanistan 
stemming from Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban. With its distrust in India’s 
international motivation still embedded in its political culture, Islamabad could only 
interpret India’s global accusations and its quick attempts to offer support for American 
actions as yet another chance for India to weaken Pakistan.  In this climate, Pakistan 
could not afford to delay its announcement of support for the U.S. effort to depose the 
Taliban.  This relatively swift turn away from relations with the Taliban, pledges to the 
United States, and a subsequent publishing of a plan toward secular politics in Pakistan 
could be seen as Musharraf’s ploy to turn his tenuous situation into a position of 
advantage. 111  On the other hand, it could have been just the break Musharraf needed to 
move ahead with his vision, with India playing the unwitting final card that would 
empower Pakistan’s hand. 
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C. SAUDI ARABIA 
Of all the influence Saudi Arabia could be said to have in Southwest Asia, the 
most notable must be finances and people flooding the area during the Afghan-Soviet 
War.  High on this list was Osama bin Laden, who not only traveled to Afghanistan to 
become a mujahid, but also tapped into his family’s vast wealth to fund the Muslim 
fighters.  The 9/11 Commission Report considers bin Laden’s reputation was not 
necessarily built by his prowess on the battlefield, but by his generous donations helped 
fund the war.112  He is further credited with financing the ISI’s plan to put radical 
Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan by way of a coup in 1990,113 
illustrating further the complicated link between the influence of Saudi Arabia, and 
subsequently Pakistan, actually on the domestic affairs of post-war Afghanistan. 
The Saudi government also provided significant funding to Pakistan, providing 
influence most of all to the power of the Inter-Services Intelligence bureau, or ISI.  This 
government organization had some administrative ties to the military, but most 
significantly worked directly for the president.  In the case of the Afghan-Soviet war, the 
ISI was used to support the policies of President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq; particularly 
with regard to domestic security and covert operations against Soviet forces or India. 
Although Zia enjoyed the support of the ISI, it was the personality of the organization 
that dictated its allegiances.   After Zia’s death and the subsequent election of Benazir 
Bhutto to as prime minister, the leading elements of the ISI used the organization in 
attempts to undermine Bhutto’s influence.114 
Saudi influence in this organization came in the form of massive financial support 
during the Afghan-Soviet war.  Paired with financial support from the CIA, Saudi Arabia 
matched donations to the ISI, making it the most powerful single entity in Pakistan.115  
This support was initiated by the General Intelligence Division of Saudi Arabia, or the 
GID.  Ultimately, the Saudi’s official position on communism was of course heresy, as 
communism mandated atheism.  This issue carried into the Saudi government’s 
relationship with the United States, influencing Riyadh to maintain good relationships                                                  
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with the CIA for the purpose of causing the Soviet Union’s demise.116 While the attitude 
toward communism prevailed throughout the Muslim world, no other nation was in the 
position to wield so much financial backing to fighting its expansion as Saudi Arabia.  
Additionally, Saudi oil interests were threatened by the prospect of a Soviet advance so 
close to the kingdom.  While the GID could not provide the level of intelligence service 
that Afghanistan required, the ISI could. Although CIA funding was directed to be 
filtered to mujahideen commanders, Saudi money was promised to ISI for whatever uses 
the agency felt necessary.117  
Religious elements originating from Saudi Arabia during the 1980s struggle 
against the Soviets also caused significant impact to the domestic flavor of Pakistan. 
What can be described as a “turf war” between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran over 
post-war and Taliban Afghanistan certainly involved Pakistan as an international player.  
Indirectly, the Sunni-Shi’a struggle had a residual affect in neighboring Pakistan.  The 
emergence of Wahabbi-style radical Islam, particularly in the northern rural areas of 
Pakistan and throughout Afghanistan, was facilitated by Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization of 
Pakistan.  Further, Zia’s backing of extremist Islamic Afghan dissidents during the anti-
Soviet war provided a welcoming environment for the growth of this extremist ideology 
in the madrasas in the Northwest and along the border areas with Afghanistan.  However, 
after the death of Zia in 1988 and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, impending 
civil war in Afghanistan could have driven the extremist element out of the region – or at 
the very least reduced its influence.  The resurgence of extremists from Saudi Arabia into 
Afghanistan, and thereby reinforcing the ideology in Pakistan, was motivated by the fear 
that Shi’ism would spread into Afghanistan from Iran.  Although not quite the call to 
arms that the Soviets had inspired, the “turf war” over Afghanistan’s religious future 
stimulated a renewed interest in securing an extreme Sunni influence in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.118  More about Pakistan’s political influence in post-war Afghanistan will be 
studied in Chapter Four.  
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D. AFGHANISTAN 
As with Saudi Arabia, the cases of Afghanistan and the United States both had 
significant effects on the domestic politics of Pakistan.  While some elements of 
influence are uniquely attributed to either country, the U.S. involvement in the Afghan-
Soviet War and later in Operation Enduring Freedom pulls the three nations into a mix of 
influences. 
Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have waxed and waned since the 
establishment of Pakistan in 1947.  Relations were good during the reign of King Zahir 
Shah (r. 1963-1973) leaving Pakistan to focus on its disputes – including two wars – with 
India.  Eventually tensions rose again when the king was successfully overthrown by his 
cousin, socialist Muhammad Daoud, in 1973.  One of the main issues on Daoud’s agenda 
was the reconciliation of all Pashtun tribal lands into its own nation; going so far as to 
deploy forces to the border with Pakistan.  This problem arose for Pakistan at the same 
time as tensions between elements in Baluchistan and the central government rose to the 
point of violent action.   Subsequently, the growing pressures from Afghanistan resulted 
in each country protecting dissidents from the other, until the impasse was breached by 
the invasion of the Soviet Army.119 
The Afghan-Soviet War had special implications for Pakistan.  Many Afghans 
fled to neighboring Pakistan, flooding border-area madrasas with Afghan students and 
straining Pakistani infrastructure.  From 1978 until 2001, Pakistan facilitated the 
relocation of some 3 million Afghan refugees.120  Additionally, the more radical 
madrasas, made more so by Zia, emptied their classrooms and sent their students to help 
in Afghanistan’s struggle against its godless invader. The shared identity and religious 
ties would bind the two countries for two more decades. 
Although Pakistan’s government denied any direct involvement in the anti-Soviet 
fight, its covert intelligence service ran a robust program that filtered U.S.-supplied 
weapons through Pakistan and to ISI.-selected mujahideen commanders in 
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Afghanistan.121 Aside from the government involvement, thousands of students studying 
in Pakistani madrasas left school to join the fight.122 
The momentum created by anti-Soviet fighters was so forceful that once the 
Soviets withdrew in 1988, the mujahideen continued its struggle for power, this time 
around Afghanistan.  Without a common enemy, however, the fighters broke down into 
tribal factions once again, fighting each other for their own power within the country.  As 
Pakistan was also immensely involved in the war, it was certainly to Pakistan’s advantage 
to facilitate the installation of a friendly government in Kabul, thereby securing a strong 
partnership between the countries, instead of a recipe for future conflict.123 However, 
with the withdrawal also of American support, Afghanistan had several years of civil 
conflict to come before the Taliban would take control of the country.  Additionally, the 
death of Zia ul-Haq stopped short plans for the Islamization of Pakistan and of Zia’s 
influence in Afghanistan, or the Taliban likely would have had quite an ally in Zia.124 
However, the pendulum could not swing to the opposite side so quickly.  
Although Zia’s death brought the elections that saw Benazir Bhutto to office, Zia’s 
Islamization of the ISI and of the Pakistan Army would have more lasting effects.  Before 
the elections, when Bhutto’s party looked to sweep the popular vote, Pakistan’s 
intelligence agency made two more big campaigns to follow Zia’s influence in Pakistan, 
then further in Afghanistan.  Osama bin Laden was at this time – 1989 – back in Saudi 
Arabia.  Pakistani intelligence officers, still wrapped up in Zia’s influence and upset at 
the prospect of a liberal woman possibly ruling Pakistan, asked bin Laden for his 
assistance to help ensure Bhutto’s party did not win the elections, thereby ensuring 
Bhutto never would take office.  Bin Laden’s Saudi-based finances also were called to 
bear to help secure power in Afghanistan for Hekmatyar.  While bin Laden did enjoy 
good relations with the government of Saudi Arabia, his involvement in Afghanistan and 
Pakistani politics at the end of the decade may or may not have been under Saudi 
direction.  However, bin Laden’s substantial financial support, all from his family’s 
                                                 
121 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower 
(Havertown, Penn.: Casemate, 1991), 3. 
122 Abbas, 112. 
123 Dorronsoro, 227. 
124 Abbas, 113-123. 
48 
Saudi-based business, certainly had influence here – albeit at the request of element of 
the Pakistani government. So, while Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia each had influence in 
Pakistan, at times those relationships led to influence flowing from Pakistan as well.125   
Once the Taliban gained power in Afghanistan, radical forms of Islam in Pakistan 
found support from the neighbor to the west.  Additionally, what would total three 
million refugees continued to stress Pakistan’s domestic infrastructure.  The back-and-
forth governance of liberal Benazir Bhutto and Islamist Nawaz Sharif, is evidence that 
the Taliban’s influence over Pakistan’s domestic political environment was limited, even 
though later elections were alleged to be rigged.126  It wasn’t until the administration of 
Pervez Musharraf that the impasse would be broken. 
The continued recognition and diplomatic relations with the Taliban very easily 
can be labeled as a good political move by Musharraf for his first years in office.  With 
the wide support for the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the 
international connections with extreme elements in Pakistan, a porous border between the 
two nations, and the number of Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan, Musharraf could 
not afford the additional domestic instability that would inevitably come with publicly 
denouncing Taliban rule and severing diplomatic ties.127 While the two governments had 
a least a working relationship, Musharraf guaranteed at least some measure of peace in 
his most troublesome regions, allowing him to focus his attention to more pressing 
matters of governance.   
The attacks of September 11 can be viewed as the very break Musharraf needed to 
get free his association with the Taliban and establish relations with other nations. Early 
in establishment of the Bush administration in 2001, Musharraf began his quest for 
improved ties with the United States.  Indian lobby groups in the United States had 
worked diligently during the campaign to secure White House attention, and Musharraf 
was anxious to begin his relationship with the new administration on the right note.  
During security turnover, the new administration came to understand that the threat from 
bin Laden was more than anticipated, and asked Pakistan for help in the capture of the 
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radical leader. Unfortunately, although Musharraf used what little political weight he 
carried in the region, Mullah Omar’s steadfast refusal to bend to Pakistan’s requests for 
any changes in policy.128 
Of the three countries that had recognized the Taliban – Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Pakistan – Pakistan was the first.  It also held the relationship the 
longest, as Pakistan was later the last to sever diplomatic ties.129  It was a matter of time, 
and of diplomatic leverage that Pakistan retained its relationship with the Taliban.  Soon 
after the September 11 attacks, moderate Pakistanis recognized Pakistan’s “guilt by 
association” with the Taliban, and feared American reprisal to shift to Pakistan as well.  
Stated, public support for U.S. plans against the Taliban seemed the only reasonable 
option for Pakistan’s future.130 In the meantime, Islamabad chose to use its unique 
position to prevent hostile action. 
Before committing fully to an anti-Taliban stance Musharraf used the relationship 
with his neighbor to try to persuade the Taliban to comply with United Nation demands 
of producing Osama bin Laden.  In addition to the possible prevention of military action 
against Afghanistan, Musharraf hoped this diplomatic engagement would prove his desire 
to support his Islamic neighbor. When Pakistan’s influence was proved ineffective, 
Islamabad successfully broke relations and focused on its promises to help the United 
States and other U.N. member nations to overthrow the Taliban and defeat al Qaeda. The 
unfortunate consequence to Musharraf’s plan was that instead of convincing religious 
extremists in the region that he wanted a peaceful solution to the problem, Musharraf’s 
willingness to surrender bin Laden – seen as giving up his life of privilege to fight for 
less fortunate Muslims – as evidence of Musharraf’s submission to U.S. control. Instead 
of taking the next step toward domestic moderation, the severance of diplomatic ties with 
the Taliban and support of Operation Enduring Freedom defined and widened the rift 
between his administration and radical extremists.  As a result, thousands of students 
from Pakistan’s borderland madrasas were recruited to fight with the Taliban, crossing 
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into Afghanistan each day by the hundreds, as well as many Pakistani citizens simply 
convinced this was the way to stop outside aggression and occupation of the region.131 
Ultimately, it was the quick fall of the Taliban, and the actions of Taliban fighters 
against U.S. forces, that settled Pakistan’s domestic upheaval.  The ease of the defeat of 
these Taliban fighters put their legitimacy of protectors of Islam into question.  
Additionally, Pakistanis who had gone to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban were 
in some cases abandoned to fight the invading forces on their own – severely 
undermining the Taliban’s legitimacy as an Islamic brotherhood.  As a result, the silent 
moderates who had previously agreed with Musharraf’s policies of Pakistan’s new 
alliances were publicly relieved, and those in opposition began to change their 
opinions.132 
 
E. UNITED STATES 
In a message to the U.S. State Department in 1995, former Special Envoy to the 
Afghan resistance Peter Tomsen wrote, “We have long underestimated the geo-political 
threat of Afghan instability to U.S. interests…. We should conduct a major Afghan policy 
review and implement a more resolute Afghan policy.  A passive U.S. approach will 
continue to leave the field to the Pakistani and Arab groups supporting the Islamic 
extremists.”133  The United States did not maintain a relationship with Afghanistan or 
Pakistan, and Tomsen’s prediction proved true.  Today, the United States is waging an 
uphill battle to establish its influence in Southwest Asia to ensure the haven for militant 
extremists does not re-emerge to pose a threat to U.S. security.  
The relationship between the United States and Pakistan is the most important for 
the purposes of this study, particularly in light of the focus of the thesis.  The historical 
influences of U.S. policy will be brief, with further study of U.S.-Pakistan relations 
explored in Chapter Five.  Although the average American may be unfamiliar with the 
history of these two nations, more people in Pakistan hold very clear memories, one of 
which is the swift withdrawal of all U.S. support once it became clear that the Soviet 
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army was about to leave Afghanistan in 1988.134 Just when Pakistan wanted to facilitate 
the installation of a friendly government in postwar Kabul, its forces and the ISI were 
caught in a civil war for which Pakistan was ill prepared.   
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan via Pakistan placed no focus on the actual 
situation in Afghanistan.  Instead, the CIA directed a war with the sole purpose of halting 
Soviet expansion in the region, away from American interests.  Support was given to 
mujahideen commanders that showed the most promise of defeating the Soviet Army, 
and not for any legitimacy that organization might have held in a post-war Afghanistan.  
It should have been little wonder to those commanders then when the United States 
pulled support for their armies one Soviet forces began their withdrawal.135  
Unfortunately, once U.S. influence was no longer assured, Pakistan found its relations 
with India to be more tenuous.  Previous issues that were still as yet unresolved were 
moved once again into positions of higher priority, but the lack of U.S. support weakened 
Pakistan’s bargaining power.136 
Because of this, U.S. intentions are not readily trusted by many Pakistanis.137  
This was made more evident by the events of early 2001, when the United States asked 
Pakistan to convince the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden.  Although they 
understood the political implications, even liberal Pakistani civilians supported their 
diplomats’ opinions that a Taliban-run Afghanistan was better for Pakistan than 
assistance from the United States, particularly with regard to the threat of India.138  
Additionally, while the attacks of September 11 provided Pakistan a timely opportunity 
to break ties with the Taliban and secure more support from the United States, Islamist 
groups viewed the attacks as an excuse for America to gain further ground toward a goal 
of increasing influence over the region.139 
Indirectly, the American-led attack on Afghanistan in 2001 caused further 
domestic turmoil in Pakistan.  With its history of support to millions of Afghan refugees 
                                                 
134 Abbas, 12. 
135 Kaplan, 170-1. 
136 Tahir-Kheli, 7-8. 
137 Yasmeen, 189. 
138 Coll, 554. 
139 Yasmeen, 194. 
52 
over the previous 23 years, Pakistan could not sustain the addition of more Afghans once 
the offensive began. To this end, Musharraf sealed the border between the two nations.  
Stories of Afghan civilians caught in the fight hit home with many Pakistanis, leaving 
many feeling guilty for their government’s role in the deaths of innocent Muslims across 
the border.  This consequence led to further demonstrations against the Musharraf 
regime, illustrating the stance ordinary Pakistanis were taking in the political 
showdown.140 
Since it began its War on Terror, the United States has kept close ties with 
Pakistan.  The history of the United States in Southwest Asia, particularly following the 
Afghan-Soviet War, puts the United States at a disadvantage for any new interaction with 
Pakistan.  Long established opposition, extremist and militant elements have the luxury 
of credibility with the people of the rural areas.  The U.S. government is facing the 




While no single political plan is ever perfectly correct for any given issue, the 
same can be said for the influence of alliances and neighbors:  no one relationship can 
carry the burden for the development of a society.  Pakistan’s relationship with India has 
been its most tenuous, taking a large portion of Pakistan’s foreign policy and domestic 
attention, but India can not be held responsible for the development of all of Pakistani 
society.  Pakistan’s own identity crisis at Partition made it a fertile breeding ground for 
all forms of idealistic power brokering.  Circumstances affecting Pakistan’s friends and 
neighbors only added variables to the equation, and strong influences from outside the 
immediate neighborhood were able to capitalize on Pakistan’s unique position. 
No generalizations can be made about the way Pakistan will, should, or would 
have ventured, given any other variable change.  The important issue to remember when 
predicting Pakistan’s future is to remember its past, and never to discount the memory of 
its people, the charisma of its leaders, or the passion of its culture.  This is the 
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environment in which Musharraf must work, and the realities he must consider when 
deciding which direction to take both in foreign relations and domestic politics. 
Lawrence Ziring believes only one element is responsible for Pakistan’s identity: 
In reality, distant powers, no matter how intrusive, cannot be held 
responsible for the course a state chooses to follow.  The complex 
character of the state is seen in the relationships of the people who are its 
citizens. Pakistanis have contributed … to their repeated failure to define 
who and what they really are and what they intend to become…. A 
reluctance … to discuss the nation’s conflicted ethos, to achieve consensus 
on the path to be followed, is at the core of the problem.141 
                                                 

























IV. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN 1999 TO 
MUSHARRAF’S PROGRESS IN 2006 
“Pakistan’s thorny journey through history depicts a panorama of 
scheming politicians, military chauvinism, bureaucratic arrogance, 
constitutional pitfalls, feudal lords, and democratic frailty.” – Khalid 
Mahmud Arif 142 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The history of religious political activism in the region offers a context against 
which to judge the policies of the most recent administrations in Pakistan.  The influences 
of regional conflicts and international relations on the domestic political situation in 
Pakistan during the course of its development also brings to light several plausible 
reasons why this inherited sense of political participation never resulted in a stable, 
permanent representative government.  These were the contributing factors to the 
environment into which Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf stepped when he 
assumed the role of Chief Executive on October 12, 1999.  The second Sharif 
administration (1997-1999) provided not the healing Pakistan needed from the tragedies 
of the Zia ul-Haq influence, nor did it produce the integrity of governance to counter the 
Benazir Bhutto terms; but brought instead a swift and deliberate consolidation of power 
with little regard for the welfare of the nation or those who helped run it. 
In October 1998, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat chose 
to resign his position, three months before the end of his term.  As a strong leg in 
Pakistan’s political system, the Army Chief had worked for more than a year – since the 
installation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – to support the government’s initiatives and 
ensure the smooth progress of the nation.  Sharif chose General Pervez Musharraf to fill 
the post, promoting Musharraf above two other generals senior to him.  Sharif’s intent in 
Musharraf was to be certain that the new Army Chief would not pose a threat to Sharif’s 
administration, leaving Sharif confident that his control over the military would 
strengthen unchallenged.  Additionally, Sharif hoped the move would prevent any 
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chances of a military coup d’etat, as he saw in Musharraf no inclination for the 
assumption of power over the nation.143 
While Sharif’s instincts were correct about Musharraf’s intent, Sharif 
underestimated the effect that his own political goals over the course of the next year 
would have on his relationship with the rest of the military. Attitudes among the various 
political groups, religious parties, military loyalties and domestic friction and distrust 
finally were too much for Sharif’s leadership to overcome.  In a final attempt to assert 
control over the military, Sharif unwittingly initiated the coup that would remove him 
from power.144 
Considering the complicated political landscape of Pakistan, mixed with a history 
of militant extremism, Taliban influence, inconsistent U.S. support, and an ever-changing 
constitution and national identity, Musharraf walks a precarious path in his quest for a 
stable, democratic, successful, secular Muslim state.  Pakistan’s importance in the region 
both strategically and geographically have placed it at the top of the U.S. government’s 
priority list, which also opens Pakistan and Musharraf to incredible international scrutiny 
– from both sides of the Islamist issue and all sides of the Indian subcontinent.   
From the beginning Musharraf had a Herculean task thrust upon him.  The best 
way to understand what he faced, and to further evaluate how he chose to tackle his 
responsibilities and goals, is to study first the political environment that had formed by 
the time he took office.  Next, a survey of Musharraf’s goals in 1999, with the new goals 
added in 2001 once the United States took a greater interest in Pakistan’s affairs, sets the 
scene for a review of current U.S. policy toward Pakistan and the furtherance of 
Musharraf’s goal. 
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B. POLITICAL ACTORS 
1. The Army and the Regime 
The military and the government of Pakistan have developed a symbiotic 
relationship since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.  Partition came about so late in 
the independence process and was implemented so quickly that Pakistan was nothing 
more than an idea upon its creation, and a general idea at that.  No structure of 
governance, civil institutions, or even a shared vision of national identity had been 
established.  Many visions grew in the minds of charismatic potential leaders, but the 
vision of the one person who led the nation was barely understood by his closest peers by 
the time of his death little more than a year later.  Of the millions of Muslims who made 
their way to the new nation from other parts of India, many of them had yet even to arrive 
in Pakistan before Muhammad Ali Jinnah succumbed to his illness.  Bloody sectarian 
violence marked much of the transition, and the members of the trained professional 
military were the only resource to settle the environment and get the new nation on its 
way.  Khalid Mahmud Arif points out that after 23 years of existence, Pakistan finally 
had its first national elections, due to the actions of its military head of state, General 
Yahya Khan. He further notes that the elections, “failed to inject political sanity” 145 – a 
clear illustration that an election does not a democracy make. He continues to outline 
other influences on the development of Pakistani political evolution, but his summary is 
the most telling, where he concludes, “that the Pakistan Army obeyed the Chief of the 
Army Staff, followed his decisions in letter and spirit, and exposed those who tried to 
undermine the military and national unity.”146 This is a clear indication of the perception 
that the military’s role in Pakistani politics is not only that of safety net, but of a force 
prepared to ensure the path of the nation follows the course toward stability.  Although 
others have tried and been sidetracked or failed, this attempt must succeed or face the 
clear probability of the failure of Pakistan as a whole.147   
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif never believed he would have to fall back on the 
military to stabilize Pakistan, and so proceeded to amass political power for his own 
office, and neglecting issues for the good of the military.  When, as the military 
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representative to the government, his Chief of Army Staff proclaimed Sharif’s domestic 
policies unsound, Sharif demanded his resignation.  In his place, Sharif named a lower 
ranking officer, General Pervez Musharraf, ahead of more experienced military 
officers.148 
One main consideration for Sharif’s choice of Musharraf was an attempt to play 
on ethnic and linguistic divides.  Should Musharraf surprise him by entertaining notions 
of seizing power, Sharif mistakenly relied on the predominantly Punjabi-Pakhtun officer 
corps to support a Punjabi prime minister over a New Delhi immigrant army chief.149  
Coincidentally, Sharif’s conservative predecessor dealt with similar rulers.  Zia appointed 
General Mirza Aslam Beg as his Vice Chief of the Army Staff after Zia’s coup, over his 
longtime friend and favored candidate General Shams ur-Rahman Kallue, because Kallue 
did not agree with Zia’s martial law.  The resultant rumor was the Beg was preferred by 
Zia because of his migrant history, and therefore would not have standing with the 
Punjabi military.150  
Sharif’s plan had two major flaws:  first, that his delays and interference in 
military promotions and transfers created animosity within the military; second, that 
Sharif misjudged the environment and professionalism of the military.  Sharif’s ploy to 
slow promotions and delay transfers was an attempt to emphasize control over the 
military.  The unintended consequence was that an organization such as a national 
military, with a history and standard of training originating from the British during 
India’s colonization, would not easily back down with such minor misuses of power.  
Instead, Sharif’s inconveniences, coupled with the forced resignation of their previous 
commander only a year before, convinced army commanders that Sharif’s actions would 
break the army’s long-standing role as part of the country’s political machinery.151   This 
point was also illustrated by the lack of a civil war in Pakistan following the 1999 
“counter-coup.”  Benazir Bhutto is credited with the opinion that Sharif’s loyalists within 
the army would try to reverse the events, putting Sharif back in office. Writer Iftiikhar 
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Malik discredited this likelihood, again because of the history of the army to rally for the 
good of all over individual differences.152 
Historically, individual examples include army commanders who harbored desires 
to mold Pakistan into their own vision.  However, the majority of senior staff officers 
were concerned with characteristics commonly recognized by professional militaries 
around the world.  Concepts such as unit and organizational cohesion and military 
discipline won out over personal gain and power.153  This outlook of the army has been 
fostered by the many years that the institution has had to step in to maintain political 
stability. Not surprisingly, this view finds its roots in the personality of the British army, 
by which Pakistan’s military was formed and by which it was trained. The perpetuation 
and growth of this identity of “guarantors” and “central to state survival” was reinforced 
by civilian administrators who always took comfort in the knowledge that they could fall 
back to the support of the army if governance ever became too difficult a task.154   
Although this integrated military fall-back proved to be a stabilizing force, the long-term 
development of Pakistani governance failed to materialize specifically because the safety 
net of the military structure prevented the civilian governance from embracing the 
challenge. 
 
2. Political Parties 
Outside of the army’s influence, civilian political parties continued to work their 
way back to governance in the late 1980s. The pendulum of political influence in 
Pakistan settled into perpetual motion, with each party winning successive 
administration, and each trying to undo the influence of the other.  More accurately, 
however, it was more of a constant battle between two families. Arif observes, “The 
country is rich in family-controlled and autocratic parties in which the genes and means 
take precedence over competence and the accident of birth provides a sure ladder for 
leadership.”155 
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This phenomenon began with Zulfikar Bhutto, and despite Zia ul-Haq’s military 
beginning and tie to the army, the pendulum swung to the other end of the spectrum with 
Zia ul-Haq’s very conservative, Islamist rule. Benazir Bhutto was elected directly 
following Zia’s death, believing as many did that she was the natural successor to her 
father’s legacy.  Finally, Nawaz Sharif, pegged as the natural successor to Zia by many, 
represented the dissatisfaction his family felt when their very successful family business 
– expanded to a chain of steel factories – was nationalized by Zulfikar Bhutto.  His rise in 
politics was not coincidental – his family epitomized the conservative flavor Zia had 
attempted during his rule.  Sharif was selected to lead one of the two main elements of 
the Muslim League in Pakistan, which in turn was incorporated into the Islamic 
Democratic Alliance (IJI). This alliance was comprised of the religious parties as well as 
the factions of the Muslim League – the support structure for General Mohammed Zia’s 
conservative views of governance.156  And so it continued, back and forth between the 
Bhutto and Sharif camps, until each had ruled twice, and their camps each had ruled three 
times. 
These two parties and their associated alliances were not the only influence on the 
domestic agenda in the 1990s.   
PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The Muslim League as a single, 
major political player in Pakistan diminished within a few years after Partition, partly due 
to the fact that its main political goal had been accomplished:  a separate state for 
Muslims.157  However, the League continued to function on a lesser scale, and by the 
late 20th Century was split into two main factions.  The faction led by Nawaz Sharif 
commanded the most electoral power. Whether this was due to popularity or shady 
election manipulation has been a subject of discussion. The other faction follows more of 
a political philosophy favorable to the Bhutto camp, and is much weaker politically.158  
Another opinion states that the name “Muslim League” was simply expropriated for the 
purpose of rallying support for Field Marshal Ayub Khan (r. 1958-169) in the 1960s.159 
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Sharif’s party seems to follow a similar political style as the platform of the 
American Republican Party.160  A smaller role of the central government and allowing 
the economic and social evolution of the nation take its own course with minimal 
“steering” from the government are elements of the PML-N view of political leadership.  
Industrial privatization is preferred, with an emphasis on “industrial expansion” to 
provide for a higher standard of living through better employment opportunities.161 
PPP – Pakistan People’s Party.  This was the political party of Benazir Bhutto, 
who essentially inherited her place in the leadership from her father.  A moderate party 
by design, the party was set to win by a landslide in the elections of 1989.  Fearing a total 
shift to moderate policies, conservative leaders rallied to assemble a force capable of 
softening the PPP’s influence in the government.162   
Just as the PML-N resembles the Republicans, This influential political party’s 
platform resembles that of the American Democratic Party.163  The security of 
landowners is thought to be realized through the welfare of the working classes, ensuring 
a suitable standard of living.  The party tends to follow a style that results in bigger roles 
for the government if it means providing social services for the average citizen.164  Under 
Benazir Bhutto’s first term, 1988-1990, the press enjoyed more liberties, women felt free 
to engage in public debate, and political views of all types were allowed expression.165 
MQM – Muhajir (later Muttehida) Quami Movement of Sindh. This party could 
be categorized under political parties or under radical elements.  Hassan Abbas observed 
that by 1989 the MQM had “become a highly monolithic and violence-friendly 
organization masquerading as a political party.”166  However, it did control the Sindh 
province, particularly the urban areas.   
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One issue of contention against Musharraf is the power he took from the hands of 
the provincial governors and pushed to the elected councils of the local governments.  
Where the bureaucracy tried to micromanage day-to-day issues at a much higher level, 
basic necessities were neglected.  Although the new system is much more efficient for the 
realization of projects and sanitation at the local level, provincial governors are reluctant 
to share their authority and so oppose the plan.  The same can be said for the example of 
the PPP and the MQM in 1989.  
When Benazir Bhutto’s party won the national election and she was named Prime 
Minister, Bhutto ran into some political obstacles; the consequences of which she did not 
realize.  Although her party won the overall election, the MQM controlled the 
governance of the Sindh.  Coordination between the two parties was crucial to successful 
governance of the province, but since neither party wanted to relinquish any political 
control, the two became adversaries. “With the active hostility [between the two], the 
governance of Karachi and Hyderabad virtually came to a halt.”167  The impetus behind 
the adversarial relationship was the unwillingness of the central government to give up 
control of any province, regardless of the degree, coupled with the refusal of the 
provincial party to compromise its power structure. 
PNA – Pakistan National Alliance.  This conglomerate of parties came together in 
1977 to oppose Zulfikar Bhutto when the Prime Minister announced elections a year 
prior to their scheduled date.  At the time, Bhutto saw no cause for concern of his own re-
election, and was feeling politically euphoric as the leader of the only democratic nation 
in the Indian subcontinent.  However, the disapproval of his governance ran so strongly 
that many parties not usually associated with each other – the conservative Islamists 
Jama’at-i Islami and the secular, nearly socialist Awami National Party – joined ranks to 
oppose Bhutto’s bid for another term. At this point, three parties then taking the name 
Muslim League all opposed the PPP and joined the PNA. When Bhutto’s PPP won a 
huge majority in Parliament, allegations of rigged elections forced Bhutto to resign.168  
IJI – Islamic Democratic Alliance. A similar association developed to oppose the 
PPP when Benazir Bhutto looked to be the first woman to lead Pakistan – in fact, to lead 
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any Muslim country – in 1989. The two main Muslim League factions came together 
with many of the more influential religious-based political parties.  The most unique 
element of this alliance was that it was created by Hamid Gul, the Director General of the 
ISI, marking the first use of religious parties by the military for the purpose of electoral 
politics.169 
PONM – Pakistan’s Oppressed Nations Movement. This conglomerate of political 
parties and 28 ethnic and regional nationalist groups joined forces in 1998 against 
Sharif’s most oppressive changes and policies.  Sharif had traveled too far down the path 
of sectarian, Islamist ideology for the identity of Pakistan, leaving many minorities 
suffering.  The alliance asked for a “loose federation of autonomous and sovereign ethnic 
nations,” although its main focus was to keep Sharif from becoming the Pakistani 
equivalent to Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar.170 It ultimately fell apart in 1999 when leaders 
of the individual parties failed to stay united against the regime and chose instead to 
compete against each other.  However, the force of this and other consolidated 
movements brought the failures of the administration into focus with the general 
population, resulting in the support of a new regime later that year.  
 
3. Cleric-led Political Parties 
Jama’at-i Islami. One opinion of Pakistan’s political process claims that no 
political party is an actual party except that of Jama’at-i Islami. However, this particular 
opinion also claims that this group is “electorally irrelevant,” and that though well 
organized, its only impact on electoral politics is when it publicly supports one of the 
major political factions.171  This party remained part of the IJI, which backed Sharif’s 
PML-N party in the 1990 general elections. 
Jamiat-i Ulama-i Islam and Jama’at-i Ulema-i Pakistan.  These religious-based 
parties, based on the Deobandi and Barelwi schools, respectively, command some power 
to motivate the masses, if the cause is to oppose a government policy they deem contrary 
to Islam.  Their influence, however, is usually limited to specific remote areas, 
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predominantly in the Northwest Frontier Province.172  However, since these remote areas 
along the Pakistan-Afghan border are the regions of the least influence by Islamabad, the 
parties can have substantial influence to rally opposition to policies the federal 
government tries to implement along the border.  
An example of their influence within their regions was the opposition to the 
Sharif-Vajpayee summit in Lahore in 1999.  Although the historic visit represented a 
thawing of relations and seemingly an Indian acceptance of Pakistan’s governance, 
Jama’at-i Islami kept the public sentiment of Indian treatment of Kashmiris as a frontline 
issue, making any other statements seem like publicity stunts. 
 
4. Radical and Militant Elements 
“In parts of NWFP and Baluchistan, especially the areas adjacent to Afghanistan, 
Islamic zealots often challenged the local authorities and vowed to set up an Islamic order 
on the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan.”173  Although these elements do not 
necessarily restrict themselves to the border areas, it is outside the urban areas that the 
central government has less influence.  Some of these organizations are outlined here. 
 TNFJ/TJP – Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariyya/Tahrik-i Ja’fariyya 
Pakistan. Originally established as TNFJ, this Shi’a-based group was unhappy with the 
laws implemented by Zia ul-Haq that favored Sunnis over Shi’a.  The drastic show of 
force in Islamabad in 1980 so intimidated the regime that the group’s demands were met:  
Shi’a representation in government advisory positions, exemption from government 
mandated zakat, and freedom for Shi’a to administer to their own religious affairs.  
Further demands were thought to be the group’s insistence not only of the repeal of 
Hanafi interpretation of Shari’a law, but the implementation of the Shi’a interpretation.  
The timing of this movement followed the Shi’a Revolution in Iran, so this desire to 
implement Shi’a interpretation was easily associated with Tehran’s desire to spread its 
brand of Shi’a outside of Iran.  In order to avoid this association and to ensure continued 
political weight, the group changed its name to Tahrik-i Ja’fariyya Pakistan – The 
Movement of the Ja’fari-Shi’a of Pakistan. Although the movement began as a radical, 
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militant force in opposition to an oppressive regime, it later softened its stance and now 
claims a stance of moderation in government.174 
Sipah-i Muhammad. The new-found moderation of the TJP does not sit well with 
this related organization.  Comprised predominantly of younger men, the Sipah-i 
Muhammad prefers a more radical militant approach to the opposition of Sunni influence 
in Pakistan.  Influence and ideology is spread through mosques and madrasas, as it is in 
Sunni-based organizations.  This group has been held responsible for violent attacks on 
Sunnis in Karachi and the Punjab.175 
Sipah-i Sahaba.  This radical group essentially mirrors the Sipah-i Muhammad, 
except that it serves the same interests in the Sunni groups.  Ardently adhering to today’s 
brand of Deobandism, the Sipah-i Sahaba support the declaration of Ahmadi Sunnis to be 
non-Muslims, due to the latter’s belief that its founder was another Prophet. Due to its 
Deobandi foundation, any group with a different interpretation of Islam from its own is 
motivation for action.  However, the Sipah-I Sahaba claim not to judge those who have 
fallen away from the “correct” teachings, but to want to guide the lost back to the true 
path, particularly those in the rural areas who are easily persuaded to take the wrong path.  
Those who influence others away from the “true path” are those who suffer the group’s 
attacks. The actions of the Sipah-i Sahaba are similar to those of its Shi’a counterpart, 
leading each group to cite the violence of the other as the justification of their own 
existence.176  
 
5. Political Corruption 
The ease with which politicians in Pakistan have been able to manipulate the 
system for their own gain has been referenced in the various deeds of the political parties.  
It is sufficient to note here that the extent of the corruption was not lost on Pakistani 
society.  The practice had so permeated political action, and had so frustrated the 
population that Musharraf felt it necessary to address the issue immediately upon 
assuming the role of Chief Executive.  The problem ranked as high as the proliferation of 
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radical Islamist ideology in Musharraf’s view, and both were so problematic that a large 
portion of his address was spent reassuring Pakistanis that he would work toward an 
honest government that would allow the people to practice their respective faiths freely.  
His agenda that followed all promised to work within these goals.177 
 
C. MUSHARRAF’S PLAN 1999 
With the political environment structured as outlined here, Musharraf’s goals 
from his first days as Chief Executive were themselves ambitious.  He promised to root 
out the institutionalized corruption within the government and legislative systems.178  
However, the crux of the corruption was embedded within the moderate political 
machines, and the most honest players seemed to be the religious-based political parties. 
Musharraf outlined seven objectives in his speech to the nation five days after 
assuming office: 
1. Rebuild national confidence and morale. 
2. Strengthen federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore 
national cohesion. 
3. Revive economy and restore investor confidence. 
4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice. 
5. Depoliticize state institutions. 
6. Devolution of power to the grass-roots level. 
7. Ensure swift and across-the-board accountability.179 
Of these, Musharraf first placed special emphasis on the growth of the economy, 
followed by the accountability of the government.  Next, he combines the goals to 
strengthen the federation and decentralize power, claiming one a result of the other.  His 
plan was to identify what elements of day-to-day, civic administration could be relegated 
to an elected council at the local level, and to do so.  His intended result was to make 
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those in the local systems accountable to the citizens of their cities; be faster and more 
efficient in the business of basic services such as road repair and garbage removal and 
management; and to make Pakistanis feel more connected and better representative of 
their elected governments.180  
 
D. MUSHARRAF’S REVISION, 2001:  DOMESTIC POLICIES TOWARD 
ENLIGHTENED MODERATION 
1. Education Reform 
Pakistan has never enjoyed a state-supported education system, while mosques 
and religious groups have run their own schools for more than 150 years in the 
subcontinent.  While some madrasas were established just as schools for one standard of 
religious studies, such as the Deobani school, others began as a way to prepare Muslims 
of the region for well paying jobs within the government and society. During the Afghan-
Soviet war throughout the 1980s, radical religious elements entered the schools and 
began the schools’ drift toward extreme ideologies.181 
The World Bank recently commissioned a study that concluded that of Pakistan’s 
19 million school-going children, less than 1 percent attended these schools of extreme 
religious ideology.182  While this figure is promising, this still leaves nearly 190,000 
children attending these boarding schools that instill only the very narrowly defined 
version of Islam espoused by the Wahabbi sect based in Saudi Arabia.   
Another issue to consider about these schools is their methods for teaching Islam.  
The Qur’an is learned in Arabic, although according to a census in 1981, only 18 percent 
of Pakistanis could read the text.  Classic Arabic is understood, “only by a handful of 
men of religion in the madrasas, and by a few university academics and researchers who 
practice Islam.”183 
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The biggest draw of the madrasa, particularly in poverty-stricken rural areas, is 
not its promise to teach Islam, but its guarantee of housing and food for its students.  A 
family can send its young boys to a madrasa and only worry about feeding and housing 
its girls and very young boys, reducing the burden on the family.184  Until the economic 
boom reaches these rural areas, families will continue to send their children to these 
boarding schools.  The only way to ensure the students get a complete education and the 
exposure to more than one interpretation of the Qur’an is the process currently underway: 
accountability for the curricula of all schools operating in Pakistan.  While Pakistan is 
working to develop its own state-supported education system, Islamabad has instituted a 
registration and review process for all schools in Pakistan.  Essentially, each school first 
is asked to register with the government.  Once registered, the school’s teaching 
resources, staff, and curricula are reviewed, comparing them to the standards set by the 
government.  Schools that are found to have substandard resources or staff are asked to 
upgrade to the standard or cease operations.  The government reports that this process is 
going well, noting only a handful of schools that have refused to register or reform.185  
Recent independent reporting notes that the Higher Education Commission, a 
program created by the government only two years ago, is actively recruiting teachers 
and professors, paying more than competitive salaries, and focusing on issues such as 
tenure and research – issues education professionals claim as priorities.186  However, 
criticism still flows regarding the content of some textbooks still distributed by the 
government that “still promote hatred against non-Muslims and urge jihad, or holy 
war.”187  Even the progress report from the 9/11 Commission claims that the United 
States has not done its part to reform education and educational opportunities and 
programs, specifically citing Pakistan’s libraries as an example of this failure.188 
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The problem with education reform is not with the resources, but in that the 
system can only handle so much work at one time.189  The 9/11 Commission progress 
report cites only specific items it deemed necessary to curb the spread of extremist 
ideology through educational reforms, awarding grades of “D” to the United States in the 
categories of “Scholarship, Exchange and Library Programs” and “Support [of] Secular 
Education in Muslim Countries.”  The report did award a grade of “C+” in the category, 
“Support Pakistan Against Extremists.”  While not a stellar evaluation, the first comment 
claims, “U.S. assistance to Pakistan has not moved sufficiently beyond security assistance 
to include significant funding for education efforts.”190  Again however, according to the 
government of Pakistan, the money is sufficient, but the system can only absorb a finite 
amount of change at a time.191 
 
2. Infrastructure Development 
Several major development projects to the infrastructure around the country are in 
the planning stages, or already in progress.  Two of these projects are expected to 
increase the income of Pakistan in the way of trade and transit. The port city of Karachi is 
developing a robust port facility, to include the construction and integration of inland 
facilities.  Since a port would do the country little good if the products could not be 
delivered to or from the facilities, major road improvements from Karachi are planned.  
At least two major gas pipelines are under negotiation with Pakistan’s neighbors, using 
Pakistan’s geographical position to facilitate the transportation of fuels and natural gas 
from east to west, and from the north to the port. 
In order to facilitate the movement of workers, and to ease the traffic burdens of 
some of Pakistan’s larger cities, mass transit systems are coming online in busy urban 
areas of Karachi, and particularly in Lahore.  The government is convinced that the fruits 
of these projects will mean more productive opportunities for its people, and more 
chances for growth that will spread outside the cities.192 
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3. Economic Development 
Musharraf’s plans for economic development were disappointing in his first year, 
but have taken off in recent years as some of his programs have begun to take hold. The 
unemployment rate in 2000 is credited with an increase in Pakistani applications for U.S. 
work visas. Reports of citizens’ complaints that the military regime was not showing the 
anticipated economic growth were profiled in various publications, supporting a general 
criticism of a military regime.193 
Recent years, however, have begun to show substantial economic rewards for 
Pakistan.  Pakistan boasts an impressive 8.4 percent growth of GDP for 2005, and so far 
counts on a 6.5 percent growth for 2006.194  While the International Monetary Fund has 
confirmed these figures, it warns that more adjustments to the fiscal policy are required if 
Pakistan wants to see its economic growth permanent.195  This cautious praise by the 
IMF is outweighed by a recent report that cites significant international contributions 
following the earthquake October 8, 2005, but also commends Pakistan’s accelerated 
economic growth as a sure step toward a healthy economy.196 
Ultimately, the next impact that these infrastructure developments and economic 
programs Musharraf hopes to see is the reduction of militant extremists.  With the 
government and society helping Pakistanis build the foundation for a better future, 
Musharraf believes the allure of extremist movements will fade.197 
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E. U.S. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 
The United States played a major role in the administration of Pakistan’s affairs 
during the Soviet-Afghan War, when it funded the Afghan resistance via Pakistan’s ISI.  
Essentially, proving this power to the ISI, and by proxy to Zia ul-Haq, the United States 
legitimized the state of affairs within Pakistan.  Once the Soviet Army began its 
withdrawal, U.S. support dried up, leaving the new Bhutto administration with little 
support from the only remaining superpower.  Many Pakistanis today have an 
institutionalized memory of good U.S.-Pakistan relations in the past, but are wary of the 
United States’ intentions due to the previous withdrawal of support.198  Ultimately, 
Pakistanis in general understand that good relations with the United States will result in 
development, modernity and economic success.199  Although the United States did 
maintain relations with Pakistan, the result was not nearly as beneficial to Pakistan, 
particularly due to U.S. pressure regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program.200  As late as 
September, 2000, the image of U.S.-Pakistan relations was contrasted against the U.S.-
India relationship.  The contrast was striking, implying that the United States strongly 
favored its relationship with India over lukewarm acceptance of Pakistan’s military 
leader.201 The Untied States became more of an obstacle than a supporter between 1990 
and 2001. 
 
1. Political Pressure 
Nuclear non-proliferation. The United States recently came to an agreement with 
India regarding India’s nuclear capabilities, and the U.S. acceptance of further nuclear 
development.  However, the same issues were not even discussed with Pakistan during 
the following stop on the presidential trip.  The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies noted in its report of Bush’s trip that the president responded to a reporter that, 
“no such deal was in the cards for Pakistan because of its ‘different history,’” then 
concluded the comment was the president’s way to refer indirectly to the former head of 
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Pakistan’s nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is accused of selling Pakistan’s 
nuclear technology to Iran.202 
Taliban. Militant extremists in Pakistan support the Taliban and condemn 
Musharraf for working with the United States against their Muslim brethren, and for 
allowing American air strikes on Pakistani border villages where innocents are reportedly 
killed.  While still trying to make religious extremism irrelevant, this balancing act puts 
Musharraf in a precarious situation.  Pakistan insists that the prime element in the 
equation to determine the success of moderation in Pakistan is the normalization of 
relations with India, and the stabilization of Afghanistan.  These two issues could decide 
whether Enlightened Moderation succeeds or fails.203 
An interesting development on this front again is the 9/11 Commission progress 
report.  Under the category “Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan,” the U.S. 
government is awarded a grade of “B.”204  Though that report was published in 
December, 2005, news reports for June 13, 2006 tell of three weeks of intense fighting 
between U.S. forces and a force of insurgents that is larger and “better organized” than 
initially thought.205 
Congressional exceptions. The U.S. House of Representatives’ subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, under the House 
Appropriations Committee, wrote in its report that Pakistan has demonstrated an 
“increasing lack of respect for human rights, … and [a] lack of progress on improving 
democratic governance and rule of law.”206 
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For several years, the United States has stalled an agreement to sell F-16 fighter 
jet aircraft to Pakistan due to Pakistan’s nuclear program.  However, Bush recently 
promised Musharraf that the United States would “move forward” with the plan.207 
 
2. Security Cooperation 
Despite the political agenda items that have plagued the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship, overall the government of Pakistan reports that relations with various U.S. 
agencies are progressing very well according to Pakistan’s estimates. 
One program with which Pakistan reports success is a bilateral training program 
between new Pakistani anti-narcotics officers and international trainers from the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration.208  While no verification of this specific partnership 
was available from the DEA, the agency’s fact book lists “international training” as one 
of its foreign cooperation initiatives.209  Pakistan reports the recent acquisition of better 
communication equipment and helicopters to help its new squad, noting that the team 
now is capable to perform drug interdiction operations against drug smugglers.210 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency reported that in March 2006, 
Pakistan entered into an agreement with the United States regarding the security of 
containers being shipped between Pakistan and the United States. The Container Security 
Initiative will allow for the screening of all containers shipped between the two countries 
for terrorists and terrorist weapons.211  Pakistan also reports that with the help of the 
United States, Pakistan’s border operations, passport and identification processes have 
improved significantly, resulting in better capabilities for Pakistan to control the crossing 
of its borders and the identification of its citizens and visitors.  While these projects are 
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not yet to the standard Pakistan hopes to achieve, the process takes time to complete, and 
Pakistan believes the progress is excellent.212 
 
3. Continuing Relations  
The most recent development for the realization of long-term stability and growth 
for Pakistan has been the establishment of bilateral “dialogs” between Pakistan and the 
United States.  Pakistani representatives will discuss developments, obstacles and 
techniques in different areas and settings with their American counterparts. The hope is 
that by establishing a regular meeting to discuss issues relating to a variety of public 
administration areas, Pakistan’s move along a track toward modernity, moderation and 
stabilization will continue into the next administration and beyond.213 
The dialogs, each scheduled and conducted independently of the others, are 
broken down into four subjects: 1) Strategic. 2) Energy. 3) Economic and Trade. 4) 
Education, Science and Technology. 
 
F. WORLD BANK 
The World Bank has been involved in Pakistan’s economic restructuring for 
several years, though assistance has increased immensely since 2000.  The last country 
brief written by the organization notes, “Beginning in 2000, the government initiated a 
wide-ranging and ambitious reform program,” resulting in a drastic turn of economic 
events in Pakistan.214 World Bank advisors are involved in every facet of Pakistan’s 
domestic environment, such as farming programs to increase productivity in Baluchistan 
to upgraded education facilities and opportunities in the North West Frontier Province.215  
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The institution last year awarded a $100 million credit to Pakistan for the sole purpose of 
expanding education in the Punjab.216  
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was correct in assuming Musharraf would 
not harbor secret plans to stage a coup; because of this, Musharraf had no plan in reserve 
for the transition of the government and changes in domestic policy to get Pakistan on a 
road of recovery.  Once Musharraf was thrust into leadership Musharraf’s prompt 
formulation of a public policy once in office is telling.  His goals were simple and clear, 
and his plan concise.  He assumed this task was rather simple: root out corruption, bring 
moderate thinkers into governance.  However, as he learned the intricacies of the 
situation, Musharraf had to balance his new plans with the influence of the past, the 
dynamic of the social polity of Pakistan, and the resources available to him.  When al 
Qaeda executed the attacks on the United States in September, 2001, the tide for 
Musharraf turned, and he was able to reengage his goals, and identify a few new ones.  
While Musharraf still faces opposition within the country, and certainly political pressure 
from his neighbors and the United States, his policies must be considered within the 
context of the political and social domestic environment he inherited, not the 
environments from which his critics come.  
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V.  SUMMARY, OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“President Musharraf envisions a modern state that provides an alternative 
to radicalism.” – President George W. Bush217 
  
Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf did not have plans to run Pakistan, 
but one fateful day in 1999 placed him in that situation.  The best Musharraf could do for 
his nation at that time was to take the hand he had been dealt and play it to the best of his 
ability, trying to develop a better life for his countrymen.  Outsiders – and insiders – 
freely criticize his programs and policies, and insist his goals are contrary to what 
Musharraf claims publicly.  However, one main flaw with much of this criticism lies in 
the basis for comparison:  Pakistan’s dynamic is different from the dynamic of any other 
country, and must be treated as such.  Policies that work in one country, even a nation 
resembling Pakistan, may not produce results in this society. 
Different elements of the U.S. government have vastly different ways of 
approaching a problem. Adding independent commissions and special investigators just 
adds to the opinions proscribing how the United States should accomplish its very 
complex goals.  In such a multi-faceted political system, the diversity of opinions ensures 
that as many possible courses of action and subsequent adjustments are explored.  The 
concern, however, comes from the lack of acknowledgement of opinions between 
agencies.  The 9/11 Commission Progress Report outlined what the commission deemed 
were failures of the administration in the realization of that commissions stated goals.  
Congressional resolutions insist that progress claimed by the executive branch is really 
not progress, and insist Pakistan change its practice with the highest urgency.  It is 
difficult enough for those participating in this debate to keep clear all of the facets of this 
complex situation; for average Americans and Pakistanis busy making better lives for 
themselves and their families, these intricacies are not as transparent.  Therefore, these 
contradictions are thrust to the front of the news, abused and misinterpreted by 
unscrupulous elements seeking their own power gain, and confusing the voter trying to 
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decide on which course of action will prove to be the best at election time.  Again, no one 
perfect solution will ever exist that solves all problems of administering to the needs of a 
nation.  However, in a true democracy, the voter must be well informed in order to cast a 
ballot for the course most amenable. 
 On the one hand, the International Monetary Fund believes overall that Pakistan is 
on a clear path toward economic stability and continued growth.218 This is a great 
evaluation on the surface, except for the underlying idea that, “the consistent pattern that 
runs through all of the governments is a negative correlation between the economic 
growth rate and sociopolitical liberalization and related democratic consolidation. No 
government has thus far been able to combine significant economic growth with stable 




The example Benazir Bhutto provides in her party’s dealings with the MQM in 
the Sindh shows a wonderful parallel to the discourse Musharraf faces today in his 
attempts to decentralize some administrative affairs of society.  Provincial governments 
resent the transfer of some of their power to local councils, though some services are 
better provided by those councils.  It comes down to the premise that no one likes 
changes when those changes are decided for them.  The hope is that these provincial 
leaders will come to understand that these changes result in services that better the lives 
in their constituencies, and therefore stabilize their provinces. 
Political mobilization, whether secular or sectarian, is not a new concept in 
Pakistan.  The people of the region have had very definite views of how government is 
expected to serve the people.  As noted in Chapter 2, the religious based mobilization 
machines have been in play for more than a century and a half, and secular elements from 
all ethnic groups have participated in representative government since well before 
Independence.  Chapter 4 outlines such a variety of political groups representing 
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constituencies of religious, ethnic, moderate, radical and secular interests.  One factor 
preventing the development of a true civil society and representative democracy has been 
outside influence – Pakistan has found itself in the midst of unrivaled political unrest 
since its establishment.  However, the one factor that remains constant through it all is the 
lack of representation of the federal leaders – presidents and prime ministers – to the 
actual needs and desires of the people. 
Elections do not equal democracy.  Simply putting candidates on a ballot and 
allowing the population to choose their leaders is not an indicator of a democracy.  A 
balance of power among the government institutions – authority which cannot be revoked 
at the whim of a power-hungry leader – is essential to the maintenance of a stable 
democracy.  The government should not be defined by the people sitting in the respective 
offices, but the responsibilities that those offices require of the representatives who 
occupy them.  The rights of the individual must be guaranteed, regardless of the personal 
views of the head of state; and the heads of state must be accountable to those they claim 
to serve, with mechanisms in place for a formalized, procedural removal if that leader 
fails.  Only by ensuring these balanced powers – balanced between the government 
departments, and balanced between the government and its constituents – regardless of 
religion, ethnicity, profession or lineage, can democracy take hold and persevere, 
regardless of the face in the office. 
This begs the further question:  if Pakistan has never known this kind of 
individuality in participatory politics, how will it establish and grow?  As demonstrated in 
this thesis, Pakistanis have long followed traditions of tribalism, religious loyalty, and 
clientism.  Changing these attitudes and perceptions cannot happen over the course of one 
administration; usually it cannot happen over the course of one generation.  This does not 
mean that all hope is lost.  Perhaps Pakistan’s domestic political identity will never be 
compared to that of the United States.  This is not a bad thing and should never be judged 
as a failed experiment.  Pakistan is a different society and has a different history and 
culture – and sees a different relationship between governance and religion.  Its people 
must approach the future with their own identities and personalities, but it can be a stable, 
moderate, democratic future. 
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One important facet in this growth is the ability to access and share ideas.  
Education is the single central element to this.  People who can read the written reports 
and opinions of others, particularly those coming from outside points of view, are so 
much less likely to be influenced by single-scope, radical personalities in search only of 
their own power base.  An informed constituency that elects a representative is in a much 
better position to back that leader when the tide turns, as those voters have access to all 
points of view and understand their candidate’s weaknesses; and they understand his or 
her strengths.  An informed, educated public is less susceptible to political corruption and 
manipulation, because the candidate’s ulterior motives and secret agenda are much more 
easily exposed and not secret for long. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From an outsider’s perspective, and considering the issues addressed in this study, 
the following suggestions are offered. 
1. United States 
Pressure subsequent Pakistani administrations to continue the dialogs on 
education, economics, strategic and energy.  U.S. support and relations with Pakistan 
have fluctuated almost as dramatically as Pakistan’s leadership.  In order to assure the 
next elected administration stays along the same track toward a stabilized democracy, 
that administration should understand that the United States is a strong ally, but requires 
particular elements to maintain that relationship. 
Stabilize Afghanistan. With the recent attention on the political instability in 
Afghanistan, highlighted by the pending transfer of operations to NATO and the 
implication that the United States is leaving Afghanistan, the most urgent requirement for 
the road toward stability is the feeling of the people to understand and see progress in the 
reconstruction of their country.  Encourage the Karzai administration to work closely 
with the Musharraf government for ideas to make this happen.  
Be patient.  Some of the major reform items, such as establishing a standardized 
education system, take significant time to develop, particularly from the little that existed 
prior to the current Pakistani government.  Assist Pakistan in the development of realistic 
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and real goals – such as the approval, printing and distribution of textbooks – then assist 
in the achievement of each goal. 
Allow Pakistan to serve as a liaison between its neighbors and the United 
States.  The familiar face is more readily believed than the stranger. If Pakistan can 
conduct working negotiations with Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, then the United 
States should consider Pakistan a cooperative partner in the campaign to stop nuclear 
proliferation. As determined out in Ch. 2, it is entirely too easy for the home team 
representatives, e.g. the extremists, to make the outsiders look like the invading, 
imperialistic, crusading horde. Iran is in the doubly unique position that it has not had 
relations with the U.S. in more than 25 years, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, which enjoyed 
relations as late as 1996 and 1990, respectively.  Iran controls the message within Iran, 
but the Pakistani story can garner an audience in Iran. 
 
2. Pakistan 
 All four Chief Martial Law Administrators (Ayub, Yahya, Bhutto, 
and Zia) also wore Presidential hats.  This was an administrative, legal and 
diplomatic requirement as the country had to have a head of state to 
function.  But in the spirit of law their designation was a misnomer.  The 
four Presidents were in reality absolute military rulers who did not derive 
their authority either from the Constitution, which was abrogated or 
suspended, or from the Parliament, which did not exist.  It was a rule by 
absolute power that did not allow for any checks and balances.220   
Solidify Governance. Musharraf must take care not to be perceived as the type of 
military leader described above, although he also cannot appear to be weak. The greatest 
example of an abuse of power in recent years was Nawaz Sharif’s second term.  It is 
entirely too easy for a strong prime minister or president in Pakistan to dismiss members 
of the government and replace them with people of their own choosing.  Therefore, 
Pakistan’s parliament is urged to amend the Constitution to necessitate the approval of 
the legislature before any other amendments can be enacted. The Constitution is too easy 
to modify, as demonstrated by Zia ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.  
Additionally, the judicial branch may have a voice in the judgments of executive acts, but 
its legitimacy with politicians is weak.   
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Standardize the education plan.  Determine in which language government 
documents will be provided to the public, then agree to teach that language in all 
Pakistani schools. One strength of the extremist madrasas is that the Qur’an is taught in 
Arabic, though the students are not taught how to speak Arabic.  This gives the 
administrators of these schools the freedom to interpret the text for their students, 
dictating their version of its intent. Allowing all Pakistanis the opportunity to read the 
important documents and historical texts, as well as their own Qur’an in its original 
Arabic, will open the idea that government and its accountability actually is for the 
people. Create a committee within Parliament to review the content of proposed 
standardized textbooks.  Once approved, the U.S. and Pakistan can work together to 
utilize some of the education funds to mass-produce these books for distribution to all 
schools around the country.221   
Establish strong relations with the new Afghan government, and establish 
bilateral programs to spread the successes of Pakistan to Afghanistan.222  Each 
program that succeeds in Pakistan should be presented to Afghanistan, with the “lessons 
learned” by Pakistan to make the evolution easier for the Afghan government to 
complete. Although not every policy enacted in Pakistan will work in Afghanistan, but 
the sharing of ideas will facilitate stronger ties between the two countries. As stated in the 
9/11 Commission Report, a stable Pakistan is the key to stabilizing Afghanistan.  
However, as stated by Karamat, the best thing for continued stability in Pakistan is a 
stable Afghanistan.  Like the two tracks of the Enlightened Moderation plan, the two 
nations’ identities must be grown and developed concurrently, not consecutively. 
Establish a robust public communication plan. The biggest tragedy in the 
formation of the idea of Pakistan was that the leadership’s vision died with the leader.  
The people never came to understand what Jinnah envisioned for the type of governance 
that would work for Pakistan.  The easiest way to undo what has been done is for the 
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people of the areas outside Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore to support a charismatic 
candidate who can rally the masses behind some ideology that starts the move away from 
modernity and moderation.  The people should be confident they know what their elected 
representatives are doing, how they intend to accomplish projects, and results of a plan as 
it begins to produce. In this way, the people stay involved in the process, the progress is 
identified as belonging to the elected government, and it calls attention to the 
improvements in citizens’ quality of live. The more communication is in the process, the 
better the people will remember what the government is trying to do, and the less likely 
they’ll be to support regression.223 
Formulate a clear timeline for some of the major milestones in several of the 
most important domestic goals.  While Islamabad gets credit for raising the standards for 
university educators, the criticism is still rampant over the context of textbooks and the 
quality of elementary education.  While this incredible overhaul can not possibly happen 
in a very short time, a clear, concise timeline for the realization of finite milestones, and a 
regular report on the progress of each milestone, will instill confidence in the domestic 
society and international critics in the true intent and the probability of success of the 
government with regard to these initiatives. 
Continue with a plan to find a solution to Kashmir.  Sometimes what is right is 
not always popular. Lawrence Ziring noted, “Jinnah’s vision of a secular state could not 
be articulated, let alone adopted, by the politicians who succeeded him on his death.  
Moreover, war in Kashmir between India and Pakistan and the failure to bring an end to 
that conflict sealed the fate of the democratic experiment even before it could be tested.  
Too much of the Muslim psyche was focused on the territory of Kashmir and from the 
beginning successive Pakistan government would be measured by their commitment to 
liberating the Kashmiri Muslims from the clutches of the Hindus.”224  The leader who 
brings an end to the violence and ambivalence of Kashmir, and begins the healing 
process between Pakistan and India over this disputed territory, will do an immeasurable 
service to both nations. While concessions offered are rarely appreciated in the 
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beginning, the overall benefit of a peaceful Kashmir will outweigh the dissent. 
Additionally, resources previously committed to the military and political stalemate can 
be used to heal Pakistan and its relations with India and Afghanistan. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
Pakistan has had an amazing journey in its quest for a secure homeland for 
Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.  The turmoil and trouble witnessed by the citizens of 
Pakistan has not disintegrated their drive for the success of their state.  While no political 
plan has all of the answers to all of the questions, Enlightened Moderation shows 
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